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Observing trends in which Wi-Fi and Bluetooth have become widely
popular, some argue that unlicensed allocations hosting such wireless
technologies are increasingly valuable and that administrative spec-
trum allocations should shift accordingly. We challenge that policy
conclusion.
A core issue is that the social value of a given spectrum allocation is
widely assumed to equal the gains of the applications it is likely to host.
This thinking is faulty, as vividly seen in what we deem the Broadcast
TV Spectrum Valuation Fallacy – the idea that because wireless video,
or broadcast network programs are popular, TV channels are effi-
ciently defined. This approach has been appropriately rejected, in key
instances, by spectrum regulators, but is similarly applied in other in-
stances regarding unlicensed allocations.
While traditional allocations have garnered widespread criticism for
imposing rigid barriers tending to block innovation, and flexible-use
spectrum access rights have gained favor, the regulatory methods used
to allocate (or reallocate) bandwidth remain embedded in a “command
and control” process. Reconfiguring spectrum usage to enable emerg-
ing wireless markets often requires lengthy, costly rule makings. The
expense of this administrative overhead is generally omitted from spec-
trum allocation policy analysis. Yet, it constitutes an essential compo-
nent of the consumer welfare analysis.
We propose a more fulsome policy approach, one that includes not only
the appropriate measures of marginal value and opportunity cost for
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rival allocations, but incorporates transaction costs. Instead of regula-
tors attempting to guess how much bandwidth should be allocated to
various types of licensed and unlicensed services – and imposing dif-
ferent rules within and across these allocations – a more generic ap-
proach is called for. By better enabling spontaneous adjustments to
changing consumer demands and technological innovation, spectrum
allocations can be more efficiently brought into their most valuable
employments.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION: WIRELESS MARKETS IN FLUX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
II. SPECTRUM POLICY OPTIMIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
A. Costs and Benefits from Defining Spectrum Use
Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
B. Value of the Marginal Product & Opportunity Cost . . . . 59
C. The Spectrum TV Band Valuation Fallacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
D. A Spectrum Allocation Valuation Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
III. STUDIES VALUING UNLICENSED SPECTRUM ALLOCATIONS . . . 69
A. Unlicensed Spectrum is Worth Billions Annually to the
U.S. Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
B. Wi-Fi Used for Mobile Data Offloads Presages a
Paradigm Shift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
C. Auctions Cannot Assign Unlicensed Rights Given
Demand Aggregation Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
D. Unlicensed Bands Exhibit Lower Transactions Costs . . . 93
E. Unlicensed Bands are Supplanting Licensed Bands in
Terms of Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
IV. PROPERLY VALUING RADIO SPECTRUM ALLOCATIONS . . . . . . . 104
V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
I. INTRODUCTION: WIRELESS MARKETS IN FLUX
To say that a thing happened the way it did is not at all illuminating.
We can understand the significance of what did happen only if we
contrast it with what might have happened.
Morris Raphael Cohen1
With wireless usage booming, political pressure is felt by policy makers
to allocate more radio spectrum for useful services. Regulators have long
maintained that the most useful frequency spaces have already been allo-
cated; that we have “run out of available spectrum.” 2 Yet, reconfiguring
1. Robert Fogel, A Quantitative Approach to the Study of Railroads in American Eco-
nomic Growth: A Report of Some Preliminary Findings, 22 J. ECON. HIST. 163, 163 (1962).
2. In 1990, when regulators reserved 6 MHz for airplane telephone calls, the action
reportedly “handed out the last remaining substantial portion of prime radio waves.” Thomas
Hazlett, Optimal Abolition of FCC Allocation of Radio Spectrum, 22 J. OF ECON. PERSPEC-
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access rights can accommodate new services or technologies. Entrants may
share bands with existing communications, often with cooperative actions
undertaken by incumbent users. These include switching to other frequen-
cies, upgrading technologies, changing service models, or adjusting retail
prices (and, hence, wireless traffic). Incumbents can also cease operations;
where they are paid to do so, this is a financially enabled means of spectrum
sharing. Such adjustments in frequency use broadly support wireless innova-
tion and economic growth.
New rules may facilitate this process. The Federal Communications
Commission, with regulatory authority over the nation’s airwaves, follows
administrative procedures dating to the Radio Act of 1927. Policy makers
evaluate various wireless options, receiving informational input and political
pressure from stakeholders, and then designate how bands will be deployed
– or redeployed – according to “public interest, convenience or necessity.”3
Traditionally, this has invoked regulatory diktat, also known as “command
and control,” where the administrative agency determines precisely what
wireless services are provided and how.4
In recent decades, however, regulators have specified less, relying on
market forces more. This is achieved, in the one instance, by issuing licenses
that define spectrum spaces, but then delegating to licensees the freedom to
determine how such spaces are used.5 These liberal authorizations, often
analogized to de facto property rights in spectrum, are widely used to host
mobile voice and data networks via wireless wide area networks (WWANs).
In another instance, deregulation of certain unlicensed bands has granted
greater flexibility to device vendors and radio users, leaving service models
unspecified and allowing considerable scope for innovation. Coordination is
achieved via power limits and (comparatively limited) technical specifica-
tions imposed by regulators, as well as industry standards nested within the
FCC rules.6 These bands have become popular for extending fixed broad-
band services via wireless local area networks (WLANs).
TIVES 103, 108 (2008). At the time, just 50 MHz was allocated to cellular services and about
200 MHz for access by unlicensed devices using spread spectrum technology. By 2010, how-
ever, some 547 MHz was available for mobile services, and 955 MHz for unlicensed devices,
not counting bands shared with other assigned services. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, CONNECTION
AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, at 84 (2010), available at https://transition.fcc
.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf; Thomas Hazlett & Evan Leo, The
Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical and Economic Analysis, 26 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1037, 1049 (2011)).
3. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, § 11 (1927).
4. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT (2002), avail-
able at https://transition.fcc.gov/sptf/files/SEWGFinalReport_1.pdf.
5. Hazlett, supra note 2, at 118.
6. See Michael Marcus, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth: The Path From Carter and Reagan-Era
faith in Deregulation to Widespread Products Impacting our World, 11 INFO 19, 19 (2009).
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The popularity of applications using unlicensed airwaves, including cor-
dless phones, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Zigbee, has led some analysts to declare
that the administrative regime should pivot. It is posited, for example, that
licensed spectrum is becoming obsolete. An “epochal switch”7 is occurring
in which unlicensed spectrum is “the basic model for wireless communica-
tions, while various exclusive models — both property-like and command-
and-control — are becoming a valuable complement for special cases that
require high mobility and accept little latency.”8 The implication is that li-
censed spectrum, while helping wireless carriers deliver certain niche ser-
vices (e.g., high-speed hand-offs for calls made in moving vehicles), is being
eclipsed in social importance by wireless applications relying on unlicensed
bands.
In a similar vein, Milgrom, Levin, and Eilat (MLE) find that “regulation
of unlicensed spectrum can be viewed as a successful example of a managed
commons approach.”9 Their study asserts “unlicensed spectrum is an ena-
bling resource that, like other enabling resources and technologies, encour-
ages innovation by many parties.” In contrast, “Licensing or ownership that
limits access to such resources discourages innovation by giving too much
power to the licensee or owner.” 10 The authors conclude that regulators
should “expand the quality and quantity of unlicensed spectrum alongside
that of licensed spectrum.”11
Both Benkler and MLE emphasize marketplace trends in mobile net-
works, where operators offload traffic to local hotspots. While WWANs
have been rapidly growing, MLE note that as much as one-half of all mobile
network data traffic is received or transmitted via a WLAN connection. 12
The use of unlicensed frequencies to host traffic originating on mobile net-
works or broadband networks is claimed to suggest that unlicensed bands are
increasing in value relative to alternatives, and that shifting government allo-
cations in this direction would improve efficiency in wireless markets.
In this paper, we critique the analytical structure and empirical content
of such claims. First, arguments commonly seek to establish the changing
values for new spectrum allocations, but systematically ignore relevant mar-
gins or comparisons in estimating both benefits and opportunity costs. Cate-
gorical conclusions are offered that abstract from possibilities for input and
output substitution. We illustrate this approach by describing the TV Spec-
trum Valuation Fallacy. Second, the administrative costs of allocations,
7. Yochai Benkler, Open Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market
Adoption, 26 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 69, 76 (2012).
8. Id. at 75
9. PAUL MILGROM, JONATHAN LEVIN & ASSAT EILAT, THE CASE FOR UNLICENSED
SPECTRUM 14 (2011).
10. Id. at 28.
11. Id. at 29.
12. Id. at 11.
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which form key aspects of public policy, are systematically excluded from
consideration. Because knowledge of current or future efficiencies is highly
imperfect for both private and public sector decision-makers, rules that best
accommodate fluid adjustment of spectral resources offer social gains that
logically form an integral component of spectrum policy analysis. While ad-
ministrative costs are typically considered (trivial) expenditures for govern-
ment processing, the reality is that transaction costs prevent economically
productive coordination across a wide swath of wireless activity. Tragedies
of the anti-commons are endemic,13 forcing transitions – including those
made advantageous by the advent of innovative technologies over time – to
be repeatedly organized through slow, costly, government proceedings.
These impediments are a product of how spectrum usage rights are defined
and assigned. They are properly included in the cost-benefit calculus of al-
ternative policy approaches.
We do not see radio spectrum allocation as a binary choice between
“licensed” and “unlicensed” categories, but rather as a policy competition
between different possible rule regimes. For instance, unlicensed spectrum,
under rules favoring Wi-Fi, conflicts with unlicensed spectrum under rules
favoring vehicle telematics, as seen in an existing U.S. regulatory proceed-
ing concerning 5.9 GHz frequencies.14 Both competing policies are “unli-
censed,” but regulators have made, and will make, choices that strongly
influence market outcomes. Conversely, liberal licenses15 are neither “pure”
(not all spectrum usage rights are usefully assigned exclusive owners16) nor
do they uniquely identify efficient business models. Exclusive spectrum
rights can be deployed to support mobile communications networks, as cur-
rently configured, but also can (and do) support various alternatives. These
include service models parallel to those used in unlicensed bands, where
spectrum is set-aside for low-power devices coordinated by a radio “type
acceptance” regime.  In the case of unlicensed, compatible devices and
power limits are authorized by regulatory rules; with licensed spectrum, by
competing spectrum rights holders.
Initial rights assignments are not destiny. While unlicensed allocations
have been compared to public parks17, the analogy works better for liberal
13. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION AND COSTS LIVES 22 (2008).
14. Stephanie Beasley & Lydia Beyoud, Vehicle-to-Vehicle Spectrum Sharing Is Micro-
cosm of Larger Issues, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.bna.com/vehicleto
vehicle-spectrum-sharing-n17179935686/.
15. Traditional wireless licenses have tended to define permissible technologies, ser-
vices and business models. Liberal licenses allow flexible-use, delegating such choices to mar-
ket participants.
16. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & SARAH OH, Exactitutde in Defining Rights: Radio
Spectrum and the Harmful Interference Conundrum, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 227 (2013), 296.
17. Federal Communications Commission, Spectrum Policy Task Force Report: Report
of the Spectrum Rights and Responsibilities Working Group (Nov. 15, 2002), 17.
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licenses. Private land ownership has not prevented, but facilitated, the crea-
tion of public parks by fostering economic development and enabling market
transactions. These trades, in turn, illuminate the opportunity costs of margi-
nal employments and so enhance decision-making. Moreover, with owner-
ship rights held by decentralized and financially motivated economic agents,
reallocations could be discovered and executed via processes that economize
on the regulatory overhead taxing such transitions undertaken via standard
“public interest” determinations. This rationalization of choices between
scarce alternatives is widely understood under market processes, but its in-
corporation into contemporary spectrum allocation is weak.
In basic respects, contemporary analysis continues to reflect the infirmi-
ties of “command and control”18 due to a lack of market prices. As Coase19,
Coase, Meckling & Minasian 20, Levin21 and others long ago explained, ad-
ministrators have commonly assigned radio rights across competing uses by
observing existing economic outcomes and speculating about future de-
mands and activities. These rule makings were heavily influenced by politi-
cal lobbying and rent seeking investments made by interested parties,
particularly radio and television broadcasters, that were both wasteful in di-
verting resources from productive activity to competition over transfers and
socially expensive in deterring wireless innovation and competitively supe-
rior entrants. As a matter of economic theory, moreover, it was clear that
regulators lacked the information to identify the proper mix of spectrum use
rights across rival applications. As a 1969 Stanford Law Review paper noted:
Determining the precise combination of productive inputs is an eco-
nomic as well as an engineering problem, and the desirable combi-
nation will vary according to changes in technology, consumer
demands, and the relative prices for different technical
components.22
But such information was not reliably produced for administrative pro-
ceedings, and feedback loops – revealing where allocations were efficiently
satisfying demands, and where they needed to be altered to produce better
social results – were weak. This formed a fundamental challenge. In 1971,
economist and spectrum expert Harvey J. Levin summarized it as follows:
18. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra note 4.
19. R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18
(1959).
20. R.H. COASE ET AL., PROBLEMS OF RADIO FREQUENCY ALLOCATION 4 (1995), availa-
ble at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/drafts/2008/DRU1219.pdf.
21. Harvey J. Levin, Economic Effects of Broadcast Licensing, 72 J. POL. ECON. 151,
158-59 (1964).
22. Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electro-
magnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-Engineering Study, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1503
(1969).
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Few would deny that the present centralized nonprice spectrum sys-
tem is economically inefficient or that it fails to further many over-
riding priorities. Without markets and prices for radio frequencies, it
is impossible to tell whether spectrum has been allocated optimally
among alternative users and uses, whether users have struck correct
balances in their mix of radio and nonradio substitutes, whether they
have sufficiently developed spectrum at its intensive or extensive
margins. Yet when a scarce resource is given away, as spectrum is,
there is a strong presumption, supported by numerous examples,
that the wrong people often use the wrong frequencies at the wrong
time; and that they innovate spectrum-economizing (or spectrum-
developing) equipment in the wrong places for the wrong reasons.23
Even angelic regulators, single-mindedly pursuing the “public interest”
would yet be unable to discern the “desirable combinations.” Nearly a half-
century later, the problem continues to plague spectrum allocation. This pa-
per seeks to incorporate that fact into discussions over competing band valu-
ations and the choices made by regulators.
II. SPECTRUM POLICY OPTIMIZATION
A. Costs and Benefits from Defining Spectrum Use Rights
Radio spectrum has long been seen as a “common pool” resource that,
by hosting wireless communications, provides value to society. As with
other such assets, rules change according to supply and demand conditions,
which are themselves functions of technological progress and en-
trepreneurial innovation. In the earliest days of radio, there was little conten-
tiousness (“scarcity”) in the use of airwaves, and “open access” rules (with
no constraints) were efficient.24 This is analogous to a “zero price” rule for
spectral inputs. In the absence of scarcity, it generally works well.
In the 1920s, however, increasing conflicts following the advent of radio
broadcasting stimulated demand for new rights to be defined. Policy makers
supplied them. Among the models adopted were “priority in use” rules from
common law; public agency assignments (bandwidth reserved for govern-
ment agencies); and traditional licenses (defining specific wireless applica-
tions permitted by private rights holders).  The latter two approaches formed
the basis of the regulatory structure imposed in the 1927 Radio Act. Some-
what later, additional spectrum use was authorized in unlicensed bands
(where technology standards and power limits govern devices, and users are
granted non-exclusive access to frequencies), and via liberal licenses (ex-
23. HARVEY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE: USE AND REGULATION OF THE RADIO
SPECTRUM 85 (1971).
24. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broad-
cast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990).
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tending exclusive control over defined spectrum spaces to market
competitors).
Fundamentally, demand for spectrum rules is driven by the social gains
that can be realized from coordinating wireless deployments. Without such
institutions, it is possible that spectrum will be dissipated in a tragedy of the
commons. The symmetric concept, tragedy of the anti-commons, similarly
results when use rights (aka appropriation rights) are distributed in a way
that stymies gains from trade. Rules that enable the organization of spec-
trum-based services so as to maximize economic output are socially valua-
ble. Of course, such regimes are neither free to create nor to operate, so the
net benefits of such rules include the costs of their administration, which
include losses from opportunities blocked by delays, as well as rent-seeking
expenses incurred by public or private agents that compete for transfers cre-
ated by policy.
A key aspect of policy performance is how spectrum rights accommo-
date, or undermine, cooperative efforts to seize emerging efficiencies in
wireless markets. There is no perfect system, and assuming that one particu-
lar approach minimizes (or eliminates) transaction costs produces biased and
uninteresting conclusions. Such was the nub of Ronald Coase’s famous cri-
tique of A.C. Pigou’s theory of market failure, which assumed that external-
ity and (other) free rider problems could be remedied by taxes or subsidies
designed by policy makers at no cost.25 Coase’s petition for symmetric ap-
praisal of regulatory institutions26 became the basis for his Nobel Prize in
Economics (awarded in 1991). The argument stemmed from Coase’s previ-
ous research on spectrum policy.27 The argument later became known as
“the Nirvana Fallacy.”28
It has long been known that price signals are useful social coordinating
devices. The lack of spectrum transactions under traditional allocations,
where wireless technologies and applications are fixed in law, deprives com-
munications markets of a key source of efficiency. When trades occur, estab-
lishing prices for resources, firms and individuals (and even government
agencies) can observe the magnitude of costs and benefits associated with
alternative activities. This information facilitates choices that incorporate ra-
tional trade-offs. When, in 2002, economist Martin Cave was asked by the
British Government to summarize the challenges facing spectrum allocation
policy in the U.K., his influential report emphasized one key point:
The fundamental mechanism by which the spectrum management
regime could contribute to economic growth is through ensuring
25. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
26. Id.
27. See Coase, supra note 19.
28. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1969).
Fall 2016] Valuing Spectrum Allocations 53
that users face continuing incentives towards more productive use
of this resource. . . [T]hese incentives should be financial and based
on the opportunity cost of spectrum uses.  In this way, spectrum
would be costed as any other input into the production process.
Price signals about the cost of using spectrum would be dissemi-
nated throughout the economy. This information should enable dis-
persed economic agents to make their own judgements about their
use of spectrum and the alternatives open to them to meet their or-
ganizational goals.29
The “price system,” in Coase’s formulation, depends on the definition
and distribution of decentralized ownership rights. It produces public goods
in at least two dimensions. The first is to assist parties attempting to make
trades to share bandwidth, producing valuable products. Many of the bene-
fits of such productive enterprises will accrue to investors, workers, innova-
tors and consumers who were not part of the creation of such property rights.
The platform itself generates external effects.
The second public good is associated with price information. By valuing
options available to many firms or individuals, greater economic trans-
parency is achieved. As a result, optimizing behavior across a wide swath of
productive activity is furthered. It is more readily seen where spectrum sup-
porting relatively low valued uses exists, and the path to efficient substitu-
tion (shifting the spectrum inputs to substitute outputs) becomes visible.
Whether such gains offset the costs of rights definition is an empirical
question. Many resource ownership rights are formally established in the
form of “exclusion,” referenced as in rem rights by legal scholars.30 Others,
however, may be defined by “governance” rules, known as in personam
rights, which extend certain use rights. Because these two forms of rights are
defined and delimited, they ration access to resources, potentially averting
over-dissipation. With exclusion, use rights are delegated to rights holders,
who manage the resource; with governance, use rights are defined by policy
makers. Coase confused the approaches, first arguing for exclusion (treating
spectrum like land, and assigning ownership rights) and then (without noting
it) recommending use rules. 31 The irony was that Coase’s central policy
argument, that markets should be able to shift spectrum between uses ac-
cording to competitive economic forces, is at odds with the centralized de-
termination of use rights. The “governance” system that Coase at least partly
endorsed is one way to characterize the traditional license approach to spec-
29. MARTIN CAVE, REVIEW OF RADIO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 59 (2002), available at
www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/Documents/Document/Document/2245.
30. See, e.g.,Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L REV. 773, 792 (2001).
31. Coase, supra note 19, at 14-16.
54 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 23:45
trum allocation. The transaction costs of administrative allocations, as thusly
incurred, formed the object of Coase’s normative critique.32
The optimal mix of rights, including exclusive and non-exclusive use
rules, is at the heart of the debate over spectrum policy. 33 In this essay, we
enter one aspect of this discussion to highlight important considerations
when using economic data and arguments to advance particular rules – in
particular, “governance” use rights of the sort defined in unlicensed spec-
trum allocations. We do not make a case for “pure” private property rights in
radio spectrum; no such regime does, or can, exist in spectrum, real prop-
erty, or other resources. Private land, for instance, relies heavily on exclu-
sion as a property model, but non-exclusive incursions are not only
commonly observed in the market but are authorized in law. In an emer-
gency, trespass is not a crime; in other situations, use of private property by
non-paying parties results in adverse possession rights that vest the non-
payers as property owners themselves. In defining access to overhead re-
sources (say, airplane flyover routes) or underground resources (say, pools
of petroleum), “pure” solutions – even where possible to conjure – give way
to practical adjustments that address transactional issues. The policy aim is,
and ought to be (as Judge Richard Posner persuasively argues34), to accom-
modate economic coordination so as to maximize total output as valued by
consumers.
Exclusive rights conceptually originate with a default template by which
an owner (which may itself be a group, as with a corporation composed of
shareholders) broadly controls resource access, and other parties contract for
sharing or using the asset in question. Incremental rights adjustments are
then inevitable; indeed, the common law develops by adjudicating disputes,
and refining ownership definition, over time. That is because the size and
scope of the rights held by the owner is not trivial to determine, and new
contexts will emerge that prompt demands for clarification on the extent of
the owner’s rights. The example wherein airplanes were given authority (as
air travel became widespread) in the 1926 Air Commerce Act to fly high
through the sky without compensating the owners of real estate below is an
example.35
Scarcity exists when the activities of one resource user impinges on
some valued opportunities for another. In spectrum, that situation is said to
32. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 793.
33. The general question about how property rights may be crafted so as to achieve
efficient trade-offs between transaction costs and ownership incentives is the subject of a rich
literature. See generally Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North, eds., 1990).
34. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Aspen Publishers, 8th ed.
2010).
35. Friedman 2000, at 44, 112–113.
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prevail when radio transmitters “interfere” with each other. As widely and
plausibly as that naı¨ve approach has been critiqued – the “interference” can
be seen as occurring in the processing of signals and is often overcome with
improved technology – the costs of conflict remain. Where spectrum users
impact each other, the possibility arises that coordination among them can
produce benefits that offset their costs. A system of constraints, including
those imposed by governance or by exclusive rights, reflects this; the rules
that develop are judged by how successfully they do, in fact, produce net
benefits.
Scarcity in spectrum has been thought to be a problem cured by technol-
ogy. In 1941, for instance, excitement over experiments with frequency
modulation broadcasting brought forth the claim: “If FM becomes universal,
there will be no physical limit on the number of stations in one town. The
interference problem is solved.”36 In fact, the death of scarcity was greatly
exaggerated. FM, as well as myriad technological breakthroughs since, may
conserve bandwidth (by enabling more and/or better communications in
given spectrum space) but simultaneously expand the production possibility
frontier in wireless. This intensifies demands to deploy additional wireless
services, producing an ongoing tug-of-war. As it has played out, the eco-
nomic value of many frequency bands has increased over the past century
despite the steady and impressive advance of radio communications technol-
ogy. As typified in Cooper’s Law37, the capacity of wireless systems approx-
imately doubles every 30 months, all else equal. Over the twentieth century,
this corresponds to a theoretical increase of about one trillion fold. Rather
than reducing the demand for spectral inputs, the advance of science has thus
far tended to increase scarcity.38 The marginal bands deployed, investment
sunk to complement spectrum resources with network infrastructure, and
money bids to acquire exclusive frequency rights reflect this reality.
While some pundits have alleged that Wi-Fi, in particular, and the use of
unlicensed frequencies, in general, spell the end of spectrum scarcity, the
case is uncompelling. Costly conflicts between rival uses of radio spectrum
still exist, as seen in the methods used to mitigate them. These include pol-
icy limits (as with technology and mandated technology rules) as well as
systems for distributing network capacity through pricing or congestion
management. The competition between various claimants, interests seeking
particular licensed or unlicensed rules to exclude others, also admit to this
scarcity: the self-interested policy positions adopted by some claimants re-
veal a belief that other wireless users may negatively impact their wireless
activities. Wi-Fi technology does not end contentiousness among wireless
36. Alfred Toombs, The Radio Battle of 1941: FM vs AM, RADIO NEWS, March 1941, at
44, available at http://www.durenberger.com/resources/documents/FMVSAM0341.pdf.
37. Father of the Cell Phone, THE ECONOMIST, June 4, 2009, available at http://www
.economist.com/node/13725793/print.
38. See Hazlett & Leo, supra note 2.
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users, even when coordinated under device regulations levied by govern-
ment. By specifying protocols for managing congestion due to interference,
network access is rationed. The 802.11 Wi-Fi standards produced by the
IEEE have been explained this way:
The 802.11 standard is a set of traffic rules that the access points
use to direct the wireless traffic among stations in a service set.
Protocols for traffic direction are necessary because wireless de-
vices communicate via radio waves. If two stations attempt to trans-
mit a message at the same time on the same radio frequency, the
waves will interfere with one another (often called a “collision”),
causing the resulting message to be incomprehensible.39
Neither markets nor administrative processes are frictionless. In de-
lineating a given spectrum allocation, regulators enable certain levels of so-
cial coordination but also impose costs. The latter include both the agency-
incurred expenses and those undertaken by interested parties (including rent-
seeking outlays). There also exist indirect costs in the form of social losses
from entry deterrence (as when an innovative technology or business plan
are blocked by legal barriers) and other distortions of competitive outcomes.
These costs are properly attributed to the allocation policy path chosen. If we
assume that the objective of spectrum policy is to maximize social welfare,
then for any incremental spectrum use rights that become available, the poli-
cymaker’s objective is to allocate that spectrum to maximize the sum of
three contributions: (1) the positive value of marginal product (VMP) of all
outputs enabled with the incremental spectrum use rights; (2) the negative
VMP of all outputs foreclosed by the incremental use rights; and (3) the
negative direct and indirect administrative costs associated with the
allocation.
The logic is that the spectrum allocation decision can be summarized by
three considerations. First, a new set of spectrum use rights – making given
frequency spaces available for deployments based on rules determined by
regulators – will potentially support new wireless productivity. These are
accounted for by the VMP, value created due to the allocation. Second, the
opportunity cost of these social gains is given by the marginal welfare gains
sacrificed as per the rules of the allocation made. These welfare gains would
be produced utilizing the next most highly valued spectrum allocation for-
mat. Third, the costs of the regulatory system include both the direct costs of
managing the spectrum allocation process, including administrative over-
head, and indirect costs. The latter include efficient social outcomes that will
be foreclosed by the regulatory choice made in the extant allocation.
39. Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *97
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013).
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Consider these social welfare trade-offs in the allocation of broadcast
TV licenses issued by the FCC under allocations initiated in 1937.40  These
rights, established in spectrum allocations for over-the-air broadcast televi-
sion, would long constrain efforts to reconfigure use of VHF and UHF
bands. That would become apparent during the development of broadcast
television in the 1960s and 1970s, when too few stations were allowed to
compete.41 It would further be revealed when the spectrum allocation proved
“sticky” and the use of the TV Band was denied to upcoming technologies,
such as mobile telephony, emerging in the 1980s. Regulators confirmed this
view in the FCC’s 2010 National Broadband Plan.42 That Plan called for an
“Incentive Auction” wherein TV station owners would be paid to relinquish
their broadcast licenses, freeing “TV spectrum” to shift to generic liberal
licenses, assigned by competitive bidding open to – among others – mobile
carriers (that two-sided auction process is underway in 2016).43 The Com-
mission cited the long delays (estimated to be 6-13 years) caused by reallo-
cation efforts as motivation for its policy reform.44 If successful, the
Incentive Auction will convert spectrum use rights allocated about the time
of War II to rights allowing support for 4G and 5G mobile services in about
2020.
In economic terms, the VMP of additional spectral inputs is given by the
first derivative of the production function with respect to the spectral input,
times the price of the output. The function is presumed to represent the most
efficient production technology. The opportunity cost of the input is deter-
mined by what is lost, i.e., the gains sacrificed when producing a lesser in-
crement of other goods or services. In general, VMP declines with output (or
amount of incremental bandwidth allocated) while opportunity costs in-
crease, yielding an equilibrium at which the benefits yielded by additional
outputs (wireless services) just offset the marginal costs (of extra bandwidth)
incurred. This equilibrium is the competitive outcome that tends to obtain
where owners of firms are rewarded for efficiency. In the spectrum alloca-
tion choices made by regulators, however, such internalization is absent. Ad-
ministrative actions create feedback effects that may reflect rent-seeking
distributions as well as social efficiencies.
That is why a primary focus of spectrum allocation in recent decades
has been to see rule makings as processes rather than one-off events. Regula-
tors have, in fact, pursued liberalization, seeking to delegate spectrum allo-
cation choices to decentralized agents. This has evidenced itself in a general
40. Thomas L. Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television
Networks: The Federal Communications Commission’s Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 875 (1981), 886 fn. 41.
41. Ibid., 880.
42. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra note 2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
58 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 23:45
dissatisfaction with “command and control” mechanisms that mandate par-
ticular wireless systems. Best practices for regulators in the U.S. and interna-
tionally generally feature “service neutrality” and “technological neutrality”
as stated policy goals. 45 A shift towards flexible-use in both licensed and
unlicensed spectrum has been seen.46
Even with these policy advances, spectrum – particularly for new or
reconfigured allocations – is the province of administrative process intro-
duced in the Radio Act of 1927.47 At this stage, policy makers make choices
between alternative rule regimes. It is recognized that allocations incur op-
portunity costs, favoring certain activities over others. The debate then iter-
ates on which applications – those supported versus those foreclosed – are
more valuable. Dueling claims that attempt to predict the value of the fa-
vored outcomes are offered by opposing partisans. This debate introduces
some empirical content into spectrum allocation choices, and is useful in that
respect. It evinces an understanding that the test of spectrum allocation’s
effectiveness is not directly observable in the planning stage, when policy
makers face trade-offs, but in resulting deployments. Investments sunk, net-
works built, applications supplied, bits flowing, and dollars trading reveal
consumer values after use rights are released for public use.
The limits of the analysis are, however, sharp. Perceived valuations
largely focus on wireless services rather than spectrum allocations and often
overlook that there exist important distinctions. First, spectrum is an input
into service outputs. Substitutes exist as input proportions can vary. This
breaks a “fixed” correlation, often assumed, between spectrum in and wire-
less services out.
Second, contrary to administrative rulemakings, markets force the reve-
lation of marginal values. Specifically, where exclusive rights are traded,
bidders base their price offers on the expected net gains derived from the
specific rights for sale. This identifies marginal considerations, producing
relevant cost-benefit data, which not only helps coordinate the plans of buy-
ers and sellers in the instant transaction but produces an important public
good in the form of revealed resource values.
Scholars in law and economics have taken keen interest in situations
where resources are inefficiently dissipated. In radio spectrum, highly valued
45. Peter Stuckmann, Presentation to European Commission in Brussels: Towards Best
Practice in Spectrum Use in the EU RSPG/BEREC (Nov. 11, 2014).
46. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra note 4.
47. The Radio Act of 1927 prohibited private ownership of airwaves and established
that all activities involving frequency emissions were to be regulated by the Federal Radio
Commission.  This agency was superseded by the Federal Communications Commission in the
1934 Communications Act; the FCC governs to this day.  The mandate given to regulators was
to create rules according to “public interest, convenience or necessity,” a broad mission that
basically yields governmental control over spectrum allocations.  For a history of the 1927
law, see Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33
U. CHI. J.L. & ECON. 133 (1990).
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platforms – such as the nationwide LTE network build-out begun by Light-
Squared, prior to 2012,48 in the satellite L Band – have been deterred due to
“tragedy of the anti-commons.”49 Productive activity has been disrupted due
to a lack of coordination when, ownership rights are too widely fragmented
and dispersed among rival parties. Transaction costs, including free rider and
hold-out problems, prove prohibitive. Such outcomes stem from poorly
specified property rights, constituting “non-market failures.”50 Such conse-
quences are commonly excluded from the analysis of spectrum allocation.
We argue that that omission inappropriately biases such rule makings in
favor of high cost solutions.
B. Value of the Marginal Product & Opportunity Cost
Before focusing on errors in policy analysis, it is instructive to see how
the relevant considerations can be correctly evaluated. In their 1992 FCC
paper and in a follow-up analysis published in 1993, economist Evan Kwerel
and engineer John Williams considered the following question: What if one
television station in Los Angeles, California were permitted to use the spec-
trum allocated to its license to provide cellular phone service instead of
broadcasting?51 Their exercise:
• Estimated the loss in value to viewers from the subtraction of one
TV channel.
• Estimated the additional value created for mobile subscribers
given an additional 18 MHz of bandwidth in Los Angeles (the
elimination of one TV station broadcast could allow the use of not
only the 6 MHz license but also the bandwidth allocated to adja-
cent licenses); gains from entry in the mobile market yielding
lower retail service prices (assuming Cournot competition and
plausible cost conditions).
• Contrasted the offsetting magnitudes, concluding that more than
$1 billion in consumer gains would be realized, in present value
terms, by the contemplated switch.
48. According to company filings at the FCC, LightSquared expended $4 billion of a
planned $14 billion investment before abandoning its network buildout after license rules were
abruptly changed by regulators in Feb. 2012. The company entered bankruptcy reorganization
in May 2012. Thomas W. Hazlet & Brent Skorup, Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons: Light-
Squared and the Missing Spectrum Rights, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 6-7 (2014).
49.  Id.
50. See CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPER-
FECT ALTERNATIVES (1986), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/
2006/N2505.pdf.
51. Evan R. Kwerel & John R. Williams, Changing Channels: Voluntary Reallocation
of UHF Television Spectrum (Fed. Commc’n Comm’n Office of Plans & Policy, Working
Paper No. 27, Nov. 1992); see also Evan R. Kwerel, Moving Towards a Market for Radio
Spectrum, 16 REG. 53 (1993).
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The Kwerel-Williams conclusions were compelling. They produced per-
suasive evidence that the value of the marginal product for specific TV band
spectrum was higher in one allocation versus another. Moreover, the analy-
sis specifically included consideration of regulatory restrictions that pre-
empted efficient market transitions. It sets up its empirical investigation by
noting:
In the United States spectrum is currently managed by administra-
tive process. Licenses not only define the amount of spectrum (in
frequency, time, and space) but narrowly specify the services licen-
sees may provide and the technologies they may use. For example, a
television broadcasting license entitles the licensee to provide only
television service. The licensee may not, for example, use its spec-
trum for cellular telephone service, even if it is technically feasible
to do so without interfering with other licensees.
The social loss from such restrictions can be significant.52
The authors proceed to produce plausible estimates of marginal costs
and benefits from assigning exclusive, flexible-use spectrum rights that
would permit market participants to strike bargains to reallocate use rights.
Were one TV licensee in Los Angeles permitted to voluntarily terminate its
broadcasting service and divert the spectrum allocated its license to expand
the supply of mobile services, a net present value of over $1 billion in social
welfare gains would result. The predicted net gains were given to quantify
the cost of the existing administrative process, not to propose a shift in as-
signments (or applications, by specific rules). The authors endorsed policies
that would not, in process, reallocate radio spectrum but incrementally ex-
pand permissible uses:  “broadening the [traditional] allocation to include
additional uses, like cellular, is essentially all that is needed.”53
Kwerel-Williams incorporated the possibilities for input substitution.54
By using standard economic assumptions for how an additional allocation of
spectrum could facilitate entry into a well-defined (cellular) market, it con-
sidered output changes when all efficient possibilities for substitution had
been exhausted. Importantly, the analysis incorporated a discussion of ad-
ministrative costs – including the process by which licenses were assigned.
Congress had yet to authorize auctions, and the authors argued strongly for
competitive bidding as an improvement in efficiency. Moreover, the analysis
explicitly considered activities undertaken by both regulators (devising
rules) and private interests (lobbying to influence the rules), as system over-
head, and factored these into its policy appraisal.
52. See Kwerel, Moving Towards a Market for Radio Spectrum, supra note 52, at 53.
53. Id. at 58.
54. Id.
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Another study focusing on relevant spectrum valuation margins is found
in Hazlett & Mun˜oz.55 This uses a cross-sectional approach to calibrate a
model of the relationship between mobile bandwidth, and other factors, on
prices and outputs (minutes of use) in cellular systems. Data in 27 different
countries are examined. Simulations using the estimated coefficients are
then used to project incremental bandwidth additions. For the U.S., during
1995-2003, the social welfare gain (for consumers and producers) associated
with 30 MHz of extra mobile bandwidth equaled about $10 billion
annually.56
C. The Spectrum TV Band Valuation Fallacy
Commission has determined that continued use of the frequencies for
terrestrial television broadcasting is no longer in the public interest. In 2010,
it announced its intention to reallocate up to 120 MHz of the 294 MHz TV
Band, creating new licenses to support, among other things, mobile voice
and data services.57 In engineering this shift, the Commission considered the
social benefits of moving from an allocation supporting one industry, broad-
cast TV, to one supporting another, mobile network services. Hence, the
Commission proposed its reallocation by citing the strong demand for addi-
tional spectrum in wireless phone networks, the so-called “spectrum crunch”
or “mobile data tsunami.”
This spectrum allocation system is not free to operate. Regulatory con-
trol of airwaves, while potentially preventing certain tragedies, can impose
others. In particular, the top-down structure of decision-making distorts mar-
ket outcomes. Moreover, given the transaction costs, including free rider
problems, necessary to correct resulting misallocations, bureaucratic
processes tend to lock-in old technologies, service models, and market
structures.
This is not an outsider’s critique; it is the argument the FCC followed in
finding that the TV Band was inefficiently configured. To correct the prob-
lem the Commission embraced “market-based mechanisms” departing from
standard administrative practice. The two-sided auction was introduced to
allow actors with superior information as to spectrum values to guide the
55. Thomas W. Hazlett et al., What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design, 10
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93 (2012).
56. Another study focusing on relevant spectrum valuation margins is Thomas W. Ha-
zlett & Roberto E. Mun˜oz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum Allocation Policies, 40 RAND
JOURNAL ON ECONOMICS 424 (Autumn 2009).  This research uses a cross-sectional approach to
calibrate a model of the relationship between mobile bandwidth, and other factors, on prices
and outputs (minutes of use) in cellular systems. Data in 27 different countries are examined.
Simulations using the estimated coefficients are then used to project incremental bandwidth
additions. For the U.S., during 1995-2003, the social welfare gain associated with 30 MHz of
extra mobile bandwidth equaled about $10 billion annually.
57. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra note 4.
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reallocation process.58 It allows the government to buy back licenses it has
issued to broadcasters, implicitly rejecting the use of administrative powers
to unilaterally change spectrum use.
The conclusion rendered by regulators is notable. Television broadcast-
ing has been allocated overly generous bandwidth on the logic that broadcast
TV programs are highly valuable. Therefore, the spectrum allocated to
broadcast TV is highly valuable.
Support for these conclusions is supplied by parties advancing (or de-
fending) spectrum allocations that support off-air television broadcasting.
Building on the assertion that more than $25 billion in TV receivers (flat
screen panels) are sold in the United States annually, 59 industry consultants
have recently claimed that:
• “$1.24 trillion of Gross Domestic Product originat[es] in the com-
mercial local radio and television industry annually [and]
• “2.65 million jobs [are] attributable to the local radio and televi-
sion industry on an annual basis.”60
Moreover, TV stations are said to provide important public services,
including free over-the-air programs that extend information to voters about
elections and candidates; educational shows that provide learning opportuni-
ties for children; and emergency alerts during natural or man-made disasters.
By 2010, regulators evinced an understanding that such arguments, even
if accepted, did not suggest that allocated TV spectrum was being used in its
most productive way at the margin. The Commission decided to protect
some channels of existing TV broadcast service, but to push back the TV
58. See, e.g., id.; Hazlett & Skorup, supra note 49. Studies by economists long ago
concluded that television broadcast frequencies were over-allocated. See, e.g., Kwerel & Wil-
liams, supra note 51; Pablo T. Spiller & Carol Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approcah
to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE. J. ON REG. 53 (1999); Lawrence J. White, “Propertyz-
ing” the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It’s Important, and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. &
POL’Y 19 (2000); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001); Thomas W. Hazlett, The U.S.
Digital TV Transition: Time to Toss the Negroponte Switch (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 01-15, 2001); Hazlett, Optimal Abolition of FCC Allo-
cation of Radio Spectrum, supra note 2; Gerald R. Faulhaber & David J. Farber, Spectrum
Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Reg-
ulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 02-12, 2002), available at http://www.ictregulationtoolkit
.org/en/Document.3629.pdf. And tech visionaries have been arguing the case for about as long.
See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER TELEVISION (1990); NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING
DIGITAL (1995).
59. See infra Table 1.
60. WOODS & POOLE ECONOMICS, LOCAL BROADCASTING: AN ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH 1 (2015), available at http://www.nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/Local_Broad
casting_Engine_for_Growth_Publication.pdf; National Association of Broadcasters, Study
Finds Local Broadcasting Generates $1.24 Trillion in Economic Activity Annually (Feb. 24,
2014), http://www.nab.org/documents/newsroom/pressRelease.asp?id=3320.
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Band allocation from 294 MHz to, depending on the offers to buy and sell
licenses in the Incentive Auction, about 174 MHz (29 channels). In resisting
this reform, the incumbent TV licensees pleaded:
Various spectrum re-allocation proposals would undermine local
broadcasters’ ability to invest in local news operations and other
existing services, and they would prevent them from launching new
services that would expand the benefits they provide to the public
and help defray their sunk costs. The combined effect of these
harms ultimately would threaten the fragile viability of the coun-
try’s broadcast service in a difficult economic environment where
challenging long-term trends are likely to intensify.61
And the National Association of Broadcasters, the trade group for TV sta-
tions, further noted: “Broadcasters are rolling out mobile DTV services.”62
This was not just another pretty commercial product, but a matter of life and
death: “Mobile DTV will dramatically expand the distribution of emergency
information.”63 In fact, the broadcasters argued that the mobile data tsunami,
the premise of the FCC’s reasoning in making more spectrum available for
mobile networks, was itself driven by emerging demands for mobile video.64
And they forecast that broadcast licenses, occupying the existing TV Band
spectrum allocation, would most efficiently meet this demand. Mobile TV
will supply “desirable, popular programming on a mobile basis, and it will
do so on a spectrally efficient, point-to-multipoint basis.” 65
As the facts stand, video has been largely responsible for the extremely
rapid growth in mobile network traffic loads. 66 But the spectrum allocated
to terrestrial broadcast TV stations has played virtually no role in this. A
2011 tech press headline suggests a more plausible causation: “The Mobile
Tsunami Is Near: Blame Netflix & Apple.”67  Regulators embraced this
view, concluding that additional bandwidth made available to mobile net-
works would provide the requisite patch.
Insofar as public safety is concerned, the emergency warnings issued by
TV station broadcasts have been almost wholly eclipsed by a push technol-
61. Spectrum for Broadband: A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, GN Docket
Nos. 09-47, 09-137, & 09-51, at 12 (Fed. Commc’n Comm’n Dec. 22, 2009) (comments -
NPB Public Notice #26), available at https://www.nab.org/documents/filings/BroadbandCom-
ments122209.pdf.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id. at 13.
66. CISCO, CISCO VISUAL NETWORKING INDEX: GLOBAL MOBILE DATA TRAFFIC FORE-
CAST UPDATE, 2014-2019, 2, 12 (2015), available at http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/
collateral/service-provider/global-cloud-index-gci/Cloud_Index_White_Paper.pdf.
67. Stacey Higginbotham, The Mobile Tsunami is Near: Blame Netflix & Apple,
GIGAOM (Jan. 31, 2011), http://gigaom.com/2011/01/31/the-mobile-tsunami-is-near-blame.
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ogy: mobile texting. This sends messages to mobile device users in given
geographic areas, 24/7/365.Those watching broadcast TV are a minority of
the total population, often a tiny fraction. In contrast, mobile phone subscrib-
ers tend to keep their devices with them, and network-connected, day and
night. Extreme weather warnings or Amber Alerts are more effectively
transmitted via applications not using TV licenses. And freezing spectrum in
TV allocations raises the cost of supplying the networks hosting the more
effective digital warnings. We underscore the essential logic: the value of
the application generally associated with a given spectrum allocation at a
given historical moment is distinct and separable from the value of that spec-
trum allocation.
D. A Spectrum Allocation Valuation Grid
The policy analysis here derived from simple economic theory can be
compared to the approach commonly employed in the following Spectrum
Allocation Valuation Grid. We describe the logic by reporting estimated so-
cial values for the U.S. over-the-air TV Band allocation, currently 49 chan-
nels (294 MHz) in VHF/UHF space. These estimates have been put forward
by parties that argue in defense of the TV band allocation based upon useful
applications observed in the marketplace.68 They contrast sharply with esti-
mates based on economic analysis of spectrum values.
TABLE 1. BROADCAST TV BAND VALUATION GRID
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marginal
Equipment TV Broadcast Administrative
Value Service Value Opportunity Cost Cost
(A) $25B/yr for $732B/year GDP $0 → claim that Ignored
Application HDTV sets; gain; $32B/yr mobile has enough
Analysis $109B direct GDP spectrum72
“stranded gain;70 $10B/yr
investment”69 “public interest”
benefit71
(B) $0 – receivers $500 mil./yr → $100B+/year → TV allocation
Spectrum not specialized cost to shift 10M Welfare gains facilitates hold-
Analysis for off-air HHs to cable/ from extra 294 up;
reception sat.73 MHz UHF/VHF; liberalization
liberal licenses facilitates low-
balance trade-offs cost market
transition
68. These estimates were created for the purpose of advancing economic interests via
strategic non-market actions and are likely biased.  That should make them reliable upper-
bound estimates of asserted values.
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In Table 1, Row A displays an “Application Analysis” listing purported
valuation magnitudes offered by the broadcast industry. In Column 1, e.g., it
is shown that such advocates suggest that reallocating TV Band spectrum
would threaten $25 billion annually in TV set (flat panel display) sales, and
strand over $100 billion in investments made by U.S. households. In Row B,
the “Spectrum Analysis” (constructed by the authors) concludes, conversely,
that the reallocation of TV Band spectrum has virtually no marginal benefit
deducible from TV set sales. Due to input substitutions already executed,
alternative networks (and spectrum) supply video content to flat screens;
increasing viewership (by switching from broadcast to other forms of recep-
tion) occurs at zero marginal cost. Reducing the TV Band allocation by 108
MHz (or from 67 to 49 channels), as was done following the elimination of
analog TV broadcasting (formally concluded on June 17, 2009) had no sub-
stantial impact on the utility or value of flat panel displays. This suggests
that the value of the marginal spectrum allocated to the TV Band was rela-
tively miniscule.
Column 2, Row A displays a claimed terrestrial TV broadcasting value
of over $700 billion annually. Of this, about $32 billion is said to be a direct
addition to GDP, which is calculated based on the payrolls (costs) associated
with the employment of 189,000 people by broadcast TV stations. A stun-
ningly large GDP contribution of more than twenty times this magnitude is
claimed to result both from “ripple effects” and the “stimulative effect” of
broadcast TV advertising, which provides a platform to U.S. businesses to
market their goods and services, purportedly worth $617 billion in annual
69. Comments of the Association for Maximum Service Television, Inc. and the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters, Spectrum for Broadband: A National Broadband Plan for
Our Future, GN Docket Nos. 09-47, 09-137, NBP Public Notice #6 (Oct. 23, 2009), 9; Spec-
trum for Broadband: A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, 18, supra note 6161.
70. WOODS & POOLE ECONOMICS, supra note 6060, at 2-3. National Association of
Broadcasters, supra note 60. (“The study was commissioned by the National Association of
Broadcasters.”).
71. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, 114TH CONGRESS: BROADCASTERS
POLICY AGENDA 2 (2015), available at https://www.nab.org/documents/advocacy/NAB2015
BroadcastersPolicyAgenda.pdf.
72. See Grant Gross, Study Disputes Predictions of Coming Spectrum Crunch, PC
WORLD (Aug. 22, 2014, 11:10 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2598000/study-disputes-
predictions-of-coming-spectrum-crunch.html.
73. Thomas W. Hazlett, Unleashing the DTV Band, A Proposal for an Overlay Auction,
Comment submitted to the Federal Communications Commission, Spectrum for Broadband: A
National Broadband Plan for Our Future, GN Docket Nos. 09-47, 09-137, & 09-51, NPB
Public Notice #26  (Dec. 18, 2009) available at https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7020353684.pdf.
This calculation is a generous approximation of the annual outlays paying off a one-time in-
vestment of $3 billion.  Assuming a ten-year amortization and 6% annual interest rate, the $3
billion is equivalent to annual payments of $408 million.
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income for the U.S. economy.74 This is taken from a 2014 study commis-
sioned by the National Association of Broadcasters.75
In fact, these magnitudes are approximately zero, as noted in Column 2,
Row B. Broadcast TV programs can be (and are) delivered to households via
non-broadcast networks. Indeed, as revealed in customer behavior, house-
holds will spend large sums (in excess of $120 billion annually76) to sub-
scribe to cable and satellite TV systems. The benefits of broadcast TV
station programs are thus available to viewers, and most often captured,
without accessing the “broadcast spectrum.” Because not all households sub-
scribe to cable or satellite service, certain U.S. policies reflect a commitment
to protect such parties from losses. Should off-air broadcasts end, such view-
ers would either expend additional resources to subscribe to video service, or
lose off-air reception. While the normative aspects of this regulatory ap-
proach can be evaluated elsewhere (many countries do not subsidize, but tax,
over-the-air broadcast reception via annual TV antenna “license” fees), the
economics are readily deducible.
The value of the current system can be estimated by the cost of provid-
ing an equally efficacious alternative delivery system. The approximately
ten million U.S. households that do not subscribe to a television service
could be served for a one-time (fixed) cost of about $3 billion.77 This caps
the social contribution made by terrestrial broadcast service. Whatever the
benefits ascribed to broadcasters’ output could be almost entirely accommo-
dated (save for this $3 billion fixed cost, amortized at no more than about
$400 million annually78) by input substitution, using other spectrum and
wired or wireless networks.
TV broadcasting interests invoke “public interest” benefits (see Column
2). Indeed, industry contributions are said to include volunteer activities by
broadcast TV station employees. Yet, if these labor inputs were released
from  broadcasting and  employed  elsewhere, they could  supply precisely
the same functions. Emergency weather reports (and tornado warnings) are
also said to comprise “public interest” service contributions. But when sent
via broadcast stations, these are typically received not via broadcast receiv-
74. WOODS & POOLE ECONOMICS, supra note 60, at 2.
75. Id.
76. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, PROCEDURES FOR COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN AUCTION 1000
(Aug. 11, 2015), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-78A1
.pdf.
77. Satellite receivers, with antennas, cost under $300 per household to install. Were the
government to hold a reverse auction to find the low-cost “provider of last resort” to serve the
ten million households lacking cable or satellite service, the winning bid would not likely be
above the product of the numbers. See Spectrum for Broadband: A National Broadband Plan
for Our Future, supra note 76, at 7-8. Note that such reverse auctions have been held by the
FCC for universal service obligations. See Scott Wallsten, Two Cheers for the FCC’s Mobility
Fund Reverse Auction, 11 J. OF TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 369 (2013).
78. Amortization explained supra, note 76.
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ers but via cable or satellite connections. Moreover, they are now commonly
supplied by mobile phone operators texting subscribers to alert them of dan-
gers. Allowing spectrum to be available to enhance such networks, ex-
panding subscribership and use of mobile devices, then advances precisely
the “public service” outputs assumed to be available only via broadcast TV
spectrum set-asides.
Opportunity costs of TV Band allocations are considered in Column 3.
Such factors tend to be excluded from the calculation of net TV Band bene-
fits in proponents’ arguments. This dismissal is based on the assertion that
mobile operators (and, presumably, all other wireless users) have “enough”
spectrum, a textbook example of categorical assertion. It fails to consider
measured trade-offs. License trades, include those conducted in FCC auc-
tions, place significant value on the exclusive right to access spectrum simi-
lar (or once identical) to that allocated to the TV Band. In fact, the social
gains (consumer surplus plus producer surplus) that are available from plac-
ing some or all TV Band spectrum “in the market,” potentially for use by
mobile carriers and other service providers, is extremely large (as indicated
in Column 3, Row B).
Finally, in Column 4 the question of administrative transaction costs is
considered. This is another commonly omitted category in spectrum alloca-
tion analysis. When rights are issued that require future use changes to be
authorized by the regulator, as is the traditional method, the present dis-
counted cost of such action is properly associated with the spectrum alloca-
tion. The late economist Harvey J. Levin captured the concern when he
deconstructed the asserted failures that would attend market allocation of
radio frequency rights.79 He saw the problem of transaction costs as symmet-
ric, and that the policy choice must inquire as to whether “the favored regu-
latory priorities threatened by free trading in spectrum rights [are] in fact
worth safeguarding through central allocation, cumbersome and inefficient
as the present system appears to be.”80 While Levin’s sage observation ap-
peared in 1971, contemporary policy analysts often appear to have lost that
train of thought altogether. Endemic hold-ups result from many current or
ongoing spectrum allocation proceedings, including the satellite L band and
TV Band “white space” proceedings, as detailed below.
The broadcast industry valuation template used in spectrum allocation
policy here radically misstates relevant economic magnitudes. The values
asserted to result from TV Band frequencies do not consider input substitu-
tions or opportunity costs, and they focus on categorical rather than incre-
mental contributions. In addition, they abstract from the benefits (or costs)
associated with use rules that facilitate (or impede) productive coordination
of spectrum in current and future periods, when reconfiguration of wireless
79. LEVIN, supra note 23, at 113.
80. Id.
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markets may capture gains as improved technologies or innovative business
methods emerge. In reality, the TV Band is not worth $700 billion a year in
its contribution to broadcast video, or $25 billion annually in producing tele-
vision sets, or $10 billion per annum in “public interest” benefits. Even if
these estimates were to be adjusted to reflect consumer welfare measures
rather than GDP contributions, revenues, or time costs, they would not be
compelling metrics because they are not derived from the marginal value of
the spectrum inputs. Instead, they associate given wireless activities with
particular applications. But these applications can be produced with varied
input combinations, and need not consume any or all of the extant TV Band.
In sum, it is a feature of contemporary spectrum policy analysis that
valuation metrics which are extremely misleading proxies for actual costs or
benefits attending to the regulatory decision extant are put forward. Confu-
sion stems from ignoring input substitution possibilities, using categorical
instead of marginal values, and abstracting from spectrum opportunity costs.
In addition, it is observed that economic data unrelated to the spectrum allo-
cation question itself are advanced as valuation metrics. More deeply, the
costs of the administrative allocation process form little to no part of the
discussion, even as the methods used to distribute frequency usage rights
will either assist, or impede, future spectrum deployments and wireless mar-
ket reconfigurations.
The example of TV Band spectrum is strategically chosen. Beyond the
broadcast TV industry there is broad consensus is that, while video content
is highly valuable, reserving a 49 channel “silo” for terrestrial broadcast dis-
tribution is not. The regulatory system has moved to make such bandwidth
increasingly available for other services in the form of liberal, flexible-use
licenses. Since 2002, FCC auctions 44, 49, 60, 73, and 1002 have reassigned
(or are planned to reassign) such rights. Given an economic appraisal of the
marginal costs and benefits of such reallocations, as displayed in the Broad-
cast TV Band Valuation Grid displayed above, the case for some sort of
transitional policy is overwhelming.
Yet, TV Band reallocation is not only slow, arduous, and too conserva-
tively undertaken, it is the exception that proves the rule. The methodology
offered by the TV industry, confusing estimates of wireless applications with
those for allocated spectrum values, is still widely employed in other con-
texts by interest groups and, indeed, regulators themselves. The framework
does not focus on the relevant costs and benefits from alternative policy
choices, and supports outcomes that undermine consumer welfare. We refer
to this as the TV Band Spectrum Valuation Fallacy. It will prove a helpful
reference point for considering the structure of allocation arguments that in-
corporate estimated economic values.
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III. STUDIES VALUING UNLICENSED SPECTRUM ALLOCATIONS
A. Unlicensed Spectrum is Worth Billions Annually to the U.S. Economy
A number of papers have appeared in recent years, both from industry
consultancies and academic authors, which attempt to quantify the economic
benefits associated with unlicensed spectrum allocations. A useful example
is Thanki, which focuses on the social gains yielded in three specific wire-
less applications in the United States:81
— residential wi-fi networks
— hospital WLANs
— radio frequency identity chips used in the clothing industry
The study gives three value estimates (low, medium and high) for each
of these three application categories.82 The conclusion is offered that the
applications generate, as of 2009, about $25.4 billion annually in economic
benefit (summing the three “medium” estimates).83 This is said to be a lower
bound forecast for the value of unlicensed spectrum generally, as many other
applications delivered via devices accessing unlicensed bands are excluded
from the analysis.
TABLE 2. VALUATIONS FOR “UNLICENSED APPLICATIONS IN THE U.S.”*
Scenarios (2009-2025) Low Medium High
Economic value generated by home Wi-Fi 4.3 8.4 12.6($ billions per year)
Economic value generated by hospital Wi-Fi 9.6 12.9 16.1($ billions per year)
Economic value generated by clothing RFID 2.0 4.1 8.1($ billions per year)
SUM OF ANNUAL ECONOMIC VALUE 16.0 25.4 36.8($ billions per year)
* Thanki (2009), supra note 84.
Various methods are used to derive these numbers. The residential Wi-
Fi estimates are developed from survey data on home broadband subscrib-
ers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP). These values are taken to sketch a demand
function for broadband, implying consumer surplus (CS) magnitudes (with
purchases at average market prices). Then the report imposes a sharing rule
for attributing the CS to the wide area broadband network, on the one side,
81. RICHARD THANKI, THE ECONOMIC VALUE GENERATED BY CURRENT AND FUTURE
ALLOCATIONS OF UNLICENSED SPECTRUM (2009), available at https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7020
039036.pdf.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id.
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and Wi-Fi, on the other. To reflect “low,” “medium,” and “high” values,
assumptions of ten, twenty, and thirty percent (attribution to Wi-Fi) are used.
The value estimates are then calculated as the product of the shares and the
CS.
The hospital Wi-Fi benefits are estimated by reference to a case study of
Children’s Hospital in Sydney, Australia where Wi-Fi routers were con-
structed and integrated into medical services.84 Nurses and doctors used the
wireless local area networks for Voice-over-Internet calls and accessing
electronic health records. The new applications were found to reduce staff
time for various tasks; estimates of the associated cost savings were tabu-
lated. With assumptions about wage rates and the pattern of adoption of such
technology in U.S. hospitals, measures of economic benefit for the United
States were projected.
The benefits from clothing RFID (radio frequency identification) tags
were produced by reference to estimated cost savings from a consulting re-
port undertaken for American Apparel retail stores. The gains stemmed from
improved inventory controls that produce both labor cost reductions and re-
sult in fewer out-of-stock items. The latter was assumed to save fifteen min-
utes per reduced out-of-stock episode, resulting in benefits calculated at an
assumed average wage rate (for the consumer).
The information gleaned attempts to quantify flows of economic benefit.
Yet, the data deduced do little to illuminate the marginal value of alternative
spectrum allocations. Indeed, the methodology follows the template of the
TV Spectrum Valuation Fallacy, making assumption-rich estimates of the
valuation of a given wireless application and then attributing them in full –
or, by some arbitrary apportionment – to the availability of a given spectrum
allocation. This does not account for potential substitution, where allotted
frequencies could be redeployed to produce other services, or other bands
could be used to supply the “unlicensed application” under study. Opportu-
nity costs are excluded in the analysis because radio spectrum access rights
are supplied without charge and cannot be sold or reallocated in marketplace
bargains.
There are several additional issues. The residential Wi-Fi estimates are
based on survey data as opposed to transaction data. The answers registered
lack reference to actual expenditures, real budgets, or eventual consumption.
There is no penalty for error; indeed, there is no cross-check to reveal such
errors, including inconsistencies in the preferences espoused. Moreover,
when the WTP responses are then used to scale broadband values, there is
no verifiable basis for attributing ten, twenty or thirty percent of total gains
to unlicensed spectrum. The assumptions are based on the reasonable idea
that residential broadband subscription service is complemented by WLANs.
But the numerical division, which purports to quantify the benefits of unli-
84. Id. at 28.
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censed bands accessed by Wi-Fi radios, is arbitrary. The outputs in question
are produced by multiple inputs, including the broadband wide area network
(WWAN), the Internet ecosystem (accessed via the broadband connection),
computer and flat panel displays, and Wi-Fi technology, all distinct from the
unlicensed spectrum allocation. The split of the asserted CS magnitudes is
taken to be fairly divvied between suppliers of the WWAN and “Wi-Fi ap-
plications,” but this leaves none of the benefits to be accounted for by (just
by example) Netflix, Amazon, Samsung, Apple, or Google, all of which help
drive demand for broadband by producing complementary goods and ser-
vices. Nor, even, does it apportion any value to the 3,000 patents bundled
into each Wi-Fi radio.85
It is also of note that residential broadband service, introduced in the
U.S. in the 1990s, prompted demand for Wi-Fi, which became available in
2001.86 As with cordless phones, which are bought to supplement residential
telephone service, households do not generally purchase stand-alone WLAN
devices. Instead, they use “plug ‘n play” technologies that work seamlessly
with their data connection supplied by a subscription with a telephone carrier
or cable TV system. Not only have broadband ISPs long bundled Wi-Fi with
the routers deployed in the homes of subscribers, but Thanki87 states the
penetration rate of home Wi-Fi as “57 percent of broadband households”
(emphasis added). The inference is, first, that broadband subscription service
is a pre-requisite for home Wi-Fi use. And, second, given this, the value of
the Wi-Fi application is driven by the WAN. The benefits bestowed on con-
sumers by complementary products flow in multiple directions. If the value
of Wi-Fi applications were to be taken as a proxy for the value of unlicensed
spectrum, then the assumption might be made that such values are attributa-
ble to WANs. Indeed, this argument is made with respect to WWANs and
“Wi-Fi offload” (discussed below), even if the multilateral flows are asym-
metrically considered. In sum, the quantification of spectrum value is illu-
sory, not only because spectrum inputs are not considered but also because
the method for numerically tabulating benefits is imposed by assumptions
divorced from actual demander or supplier behavior.
The value estimates for Hospital Wi-Fi illustrate the importance of in-
cluding possibilities for input and output substitution. The attempt is to cap-
ture dollar gains from “voice over Wi-Fi and wireless electronic health
records[EHR].”88 But the activities that contribute the gains in question are
delivered via existing alternatives: wireless phone networks are particularly
close substitutes. Even if Wi-Fi is found to often host superior services for
85. See In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144061, at *97 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013) for a discussion of how to value marginal contribu-
tions (by certain intellectual property owners) producing Wi-Fi-based applications.
86. THANKI, supra note 81, at 18.
87. Id. at 25.
88. THANKI, supra note 81, at 29.
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voice and/or data, either by cost or quality criteria, the conclusion would still
not suggest that the unlicensed spectrum used in the application contributes
net value. That would depend on what spectrum is occupied by the alterna-
tives and what costs are thereby incurred from new, conflicting deploy-
ments. The use of unlicensed bands might well prove efficient, but so might
spectrum allocated by liberal licenses. And the impact of incremental alloca-
tions on the provision of such services is not addressed.
RFID chips (wireless tags that flash digital data for the units they attach
to) are useful in implementing inventory controls in wholesale and retail
distribution chains. Yet, the gains from resulting improvements, such as
“just in time” product stocking, are not entirely generated by the unlicensed
bands RFID chips sometimes use for spectrum access. Nor would additional
unlicensed frequencies necessarily produce positive results, particularly after
substitution possibilities and opportunity costs of spectrum were properly
accounted for. (Again, substitution – say, using licensed frequencies or bar
code scanner, in place of RFID radios using unlicensed spectrum – is not
considered.) Nonetheless, the inventory control benefits demonstrated in a
given retail market study are assumed to be proxies for the value of the
unlicensed spectrum.
RFID radios are widely utilized and growing rapidly. The global sales of
such radio chipsets were forecast to rise from about 2 billion in 2008 to 3.5
billion in 2014.89 The elusive connection between applications and marginal
spectrum values might be gleaned, however, by considering the bands allo-
cated to RFID. Just four frequency spaces have been dedicated for RFID
applications, as shown in Table 3. RFID chips can also use at least part of
the 900 MHz and 2.4 GHz ISM bands, sharing airwave access with Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, and much else. RFID devices characteristically emit only limited
data flows, and connect over short-range links (one meter or less for the
devices using the four dedicated bands), which tends to constrain demand by
RFID users for frequency space. Yet data on current bands offer little or no
guidance on whether additional bandwidth can be productively utilized. Are
the billions of current chips accessing small slices of dedicated bandwidth
(and some shared access) to be interpreted as suggesting that there is not
much demand (even at a price of zero) for more RFID bandwidth, or the
reverse – that doubling RFID bandwidth would lead to highly valuable in-
creases in deployments? The marketplace evidence referenced does not an-
swer this basic query.
Hence, the question is not, given current unlicensed bands, whether cur-
rent RFID deployments generate value. Presumably they do, as firms often
invest in them. But that does not illuminate the spectrum allocation VMP
question for marginal RFID frequency set-asides, nor delineate the portion
89. THANKI, supra note 81, at 19.
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of VMP specifically attributable to new unlicensed spectrum.90 If firms sup-
plying RFID services had to compensate (or outbid) rival users of the sug-
gested new spectrum allocations, would they volunteer to pay that price – or,
instead, choose to more intensely share existing licensed or unlicensed bands
or, perhaps, shift to alternative technologies not consuming so much
bandwidth?
TABLE 3. BANDS USED BY RFID CHIPS*
Band Bandwidth Designated Allocation
0.130 MHz 0.009 MHz RFID
0.144 MHz 0.008 MHz RFID
6.780 MHz 0.030 RFID
13.560 MHz 0.014 RFID
900 MHz 26 MHz Industrial, Scientific, Medical (ISM)
2.4 GHz 84 MHz ISM
* Thanki (2009) supra note 84 at 10.
Hard to say from the data given.
In sum, the Thanki estimates purport to quantify “Economic benefits of
selected unlicensed applications.”91 At their best, these appraisals fail to
evaluate alternative spectrum allocations. Just as TV Spectrum generates so-
cial benefits proxied by TV broadcasting programs, unlicensed spectrum
benefits are not equal to the sum of the “unlicensed applications.” In fact,
there are no “unlicensed applications” but a range of wireless services,
which can use bandwidth supplied by unlicensed access rights, among other
inputs, and which compete with other services (outputs). And, there is no
attempt to define or evaluate the costs or benefits associated with marginal
spectrum allocations.
Even at this, however, the study notes that the gains associated with
wireless applications hosted by licensed bands, notably mobile phone ser-
vices, are “an order of magnitude greater than the combined value created by
the three unlicensed uses we have assessed.”92 This refers to studies that
U.S. mobile networks generate about $200 billion annually in economic sur-
plus. The paper attributes the difference to the fact that:
[T]he two numbers cannot be directly compared. Whereas the $200
billion figure93 encompasses the vast majority of licensed usage of
90. It also ignores the administrative costs of allocations, which we will return to later.
91. THANKI, supra note 81, at 34.
92. Id. at 35.
93. For this estimate, the quoted passage cites to Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Trage-
dies, YALE J. ON REG. 243 (2005).
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spectrum, our estimate of $16-37 billion only looks at the small part
of the increasingly large unlicensed ecosystem. . . .94
There is truth in the statement that the “numbers cannot be directly com-
pared.”95 Mobile services generate data that more easily permit benefits to be
inferred from actual customer purchases. Inputs, in the form of liberal li-
censes, also trade and thus generate prices revealing marginal valuations for
bandwidth. These are features, not bugs, when the objective is to evaluate
trade-offs.
Investment complementarities suggest additional social benefits. Li-
censes supporting mobile services – from cellular, to personal communica-
tions services (PCS), to 3G, to 4G – have provided strong incentives for
network build-outs. That is, once cellular licenses were distributed in the
U.S. in the 1980s, licensees sank substantial capital in physical infrastructure
to complement the RF interface via licensed frequencies. Ad hoc mesh net-
works, alternatively, could theoretically have supported the same mobile
communications services with a competing architectural design using radios
accessing unlicensed bands.96 But despite regulators making such bands
available, with access priced at zero, mobile networks utilizing costly li-
censes (with exclusive rights purchased in government auctions and secon-
dary markets) have proven competitively superior, dominating revenue
flows reflecting the choices of end users in the marketplace. And that carri-
ers supplying services bid spectral inputs away from alternative uses sug-
gests that net benefits are being generated –in excess of opportunity costs
and assessed at the margin.
Several studies have followed up on Thanki (2009). 97 Katz offers an
approach that is important to note in the following respects. 98 First, it pro-
duces claims that applications relying on unlicensed spectrum access gener-
ate at least $140 billion in annual value for the U.S. economy. It increases
94. THANKI, supra note 81, at 35.
95. Id.
96. See Benkler, Yochai, Some Economics of Wirless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 25 (2002).
97. This work is often financially supported by economic interests favoring additional
unlicensed spectrum allocations. THANKI, supra note 8282, was commissioned by Microsoft;
Richard Thanki The Economic Significance of Licence-Exempt Spectrum to the Future of the
Internet (June 2012), available at http://www.wirelessinnovationalliance.org/index.cfm?object
id=DC8708C0-D1D2-11E1-96E9000C296BA163, was funded by Microsoft; MILGROM ET AL.,
supra note 99, by Google; RAUL KATZ, ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF UNLI-
CENSED SPECTRUM IN THE UNITED STATES (2014), available at http://www.wififorward.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Value-of-Unlicensed-Spectrum-to-the-US-Economy-Full-Report
.pdf, by a consortium including “Comcast and Google and other companies.”  Mark Cooper,
Efficiency Gains and Consumer Benefits of Unlicensed Access to the Public Airwaves: The
Dramatic Success of Combining Market Principles and Shared Access (Jan. 2012), available
at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/EFFICIENCYGAINS-1-31.pdf, reports no funding
source.
98. KATZ, supra note 97.
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the Thanki estimates nearly 500% by reviewing more recent reports, adding
applications, including extra sources of gain from given applications, and by
increasing calculations to reflect increased usage, 2009-14. A review of the
tabulation presented appears here in Table 4 (as titled in Katz 2014):
TABLE 4. UNITED STATES: PRIOR RESEARCH ON THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
UNLICENSED SPECTRUM (IN $ BILLIONS)99
Thanki Milgrom et al. Thanki Cooper Composite
Effect (2009) (2011) (2012) (2012) (Katz 2014)
Consumer 25.0 N.A. 20.0 25.0Surplus
Producer
Wi-Fi
N.A. 8.5 26.0 26.0Surplus
Cellular Return to N.A. 12.0 N.A. N.A. 12.0Offloading Speed
New
Business N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Revenue
Subtotal 37.0 8.5 46.0 63.0
Residential Wi-Fi 4.3 – 12.6 > 12.6 15.5 38.0 38.0
Producer 5.5 N.A. N.A. 7.5Surplus
Wi-Fi Only Consumer N.A. 7.5 N.A. N.A. 7.5Tablets Surplus
Subtotal 15.0 N.A. N.A. 15.0
Hospital Wi-Fi 9.6 – 16.1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 16.1
Clothing RFID 2.0 – 8.1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 8.1
Wireless Internet
Service Providers N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
(WISPs)
Total 16.0 – 36.8 64.6 24.0 84.0 140.2
* Thanki (2009), 5. In four entries, where the original table does not give a value, it is here
listed as “N.A.” (not applicable).  Sources: Thanki (2009), supra note 84; Milgrom et al.
(2011), supra note 12; Thanki (2012); Katz (2014).
There is large variance in the estimates offered. Katz argues that even
the higher magnitudes in the “Composite” estimates do not capture the ex-
tent of the social gains from unlicensed spectrum due to the exclusion of
“ ‘spillover’ value in other domains.” 100 The example given involves “tech-
nologies operating in unlicensed bands [that] have the ability to offload data
99. THANKI, supra note 81, at 34.
100. Id. at 6.
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traffic from cellular networks. . . .”101 The idea that there remain unquanti-
fied social benefits from unlicensed spectrum is true, but universally so: no
spectrum valuations, for licensed, unlicensed or other (say, government) as-
signments, will be complete.
The deeper issue, however, is illuminated by the title of the table. In
characterizing given wireless applications that access unlicensed spectrum,
Katz puts forward valuations identified as “Economic Value of Unlicensed
Spectrum.”102 There is no differentiation of bandwidth increments, and no
analysis to impute value to spectrum inputs except by assumption. With sev-
eral applications the paper justifies the attribution of value to unlicensed
spectrum by saying, as with (for example) Wireless Internet Service provid-
ers (WISPs), that “[t]hese revenues would not exist without the availability
of unlicensed spectrum.”103 The assertion simply assumes away the issue
under investigation. And it is empirically dubious.
FIG. 1. CLEARWIRE SUBSCRIBERS, 2006-11104
The nation’s largest WISP was, by then, Clearwire, which served about
8 million subscribers with wireless broadband access in 2011. In 2012, it
was acquired by mobile carrier Sprint.105  By reference to FCC “fixed wire-
less broadband” subscriber totals, this made Clearwire responsible for on the
order of 90% of the WISP industry, as just 777,000 subscribers were
counted in the “Fixed Wireless” broadband service category as of year-end
101. Id. at 6-8.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Source: Clearwire quarterly reports. Sprint no longer reports Clearwire ISP
subscribers separately.
105. Previously, Clearwire  (which issued  an IPO  in 2007) had  attracted  equity invest-
ments  from Intel, Google, and cable TV carriers, as well as Sprint, which announced it was
acquiring the firm in 2012 (the merger closed in 2013). Sprint no longer reports Clearwire ISP
subscribers separately.
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2012 (see Table 5). 106  Clearwire supplied Internet access using liberally
licensed 2.5 GHz frequencies (now called Broadband Radio Service107). In
this effort, it shifted technologies from its original WiMax deployment to
LTE. This made Clearwire’s product similar, if not identical, to that supplied
by wireless carriers such as Verizon, AT&T, Sprint (its parent) and T-Mo-
bile, all of which rely on FCC mobile licenses.
The FCC counts Clearwire subscribers in “Mobile Wireless” rather than
“Fixed Wireless.”108 But this business model distinction does not mean that
the products serve separate economic markets. Clearly, they are substitutes
to a very considerable degree. The fact that Clearwire’s ISP offering uses
licensed spectrum and dominates subscribership in the segment (against
WISPs which can, and sometimes do, utilize unlicensed bands) leaves more
than ninety-nine percent of wireless Internet users reliant on licensed spec-
trum. It is, to be sure, not the case that WISP “revenues would not exist
without the availability of unlicensed spectrum” except by reference to an
artificial and perverse truncation of the service category. Some 200 million
U.S. subscribers obtain wireless internet access via licensed spectrum. As
the broadband Internet access market has developed, licensed spectrum has
supplied the conduit of choice. This is despite the “free access” available on
unlicensed bands and claims in the late 1990s that WISPs such as Metricom,
using 900 MHz ISM frequencies, presaged a disruptive business model that
would challenge existing modes of Internet access.109
106. As of year-end 2013, the FCC reported under one million such subscribers for the
U.S. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2013
(2014), available at https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2014/db1016/
DOC-329973A1.pdf. By numerical implication, the Clearwire broadband totals are excluded
from the “fixed wireless broadband” category by the FCC, possibly because the Clearwire
service offers mobility as well as fixed 4G connectivity.
107. Clearwire/Sprint also utilizes licensed bandwidth assigned to Educational Broad-
band Service licenses (EBS), with access rights leased from non-profit institutions.
108. FED. COMM. COMM’N, supra note 109.
109. See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building The Commons of The Dig-
itally Networked Enviornment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 325-26 (1998).
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TABLE 5. SUBSCRIBERS FOR VARIOUS ISP SERVICES
(2011-13, THOUSANDS)
Technology Dec. 2011 Dec. 2012 Dec. 2013
Total 230,201 262,564 293,397
Total Fixed 88,317 92,511 96,032
aDSL 31,330 30,974 30,690
sDSL 148 132 108
Other Wireline 795 796 772
Cable Modem 48,263 51,646 54,009
FTTP 5,898 6,733 7,745
Satellite 1,190 1,623 1,849
Fixed Wireless 693 777 858
Mobile Wireless 141,883 170,053 197,365
110The WISP confusion represents only one aspect of the general analyti-
cal problem of seeing associated particular applications, and even business
models, as value proxies for unlicensed frequency valuations. The rules
should be judged not narrowly on what happens given an existing situation
in the marketplace – outcomes endogenous to existing regulations, including
the zero-price access allowed for unlicensed access – and consider the whole
range of outcomes for incremental shifts in allocations going forward. That
this is a difficult exercise, and is made less tractable lacking direct observa-
tion of market transactions for spectrum access rights, is central to the valua-
tion exercise ostensibly undertaken. This, in fact, was the key argument of
the policy critique applied by Harvey Levin, who searched for new institu-
tions that might better inform decision makers allocating bandwidth between
markets.111 The idea that unlicensed spectrum poses more daunting value
estimation problems is specifically noted by Katz, when he writes that “since
many of the services that rely on unlicensed spectrum are not sold it is diffi-
cult to estimate the consumers’ willingness to pay as it has been done in the
case of licensed spectrum.”112 The policy implication, however, is left
dangling.
Thanki was careful to note that the valuations offered for “unlicensed
applications” were not large compared to the “total economic value gener-
ated by licensed uses of the spectrum. . . [of] around $250 billion per
year.”113 He argues, however, that his valuation estimates are incomplete,
having omitted several applications using unlicensed spectrum. Since
110. FED. COMM. COMM’N, supra note 109.
111. See HARVEY, supra note 23.
112. KATZ, supra note 97, at 4.
113. THANKI, supra note 81, at 22.
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Thanki, several papers have imputed value to a wider range of services and,
thus, higher asserted spectrum valuations, as summarized in Katz.114 See Ta-
ble 4, above. The problem is three-fold. First, as a matter of theory, applica-
tion values (even when accurately measured) do not reliably sum to
spectrum valuation, indicate marginal benefits, or account for opportunity
costs. Second, the measured application values far exceed alternative meth-
ods for calculating the value of services using unlicensed devices. For in-
stance, Wi-Fi chipsets, which incorporate some 3,000 patents, have
generated transactions revealing the value of the economic gain associated
with all Wi-Fi device sales. In 2013, a U.S. federal court determined that the
global sales of Wi-Fi chips (in 2013) were 1.548 billion units at an average
price of $3.05 each. The economic gain was determined by the product of
the mean unit profit (12.1 percent) and total revenues, or $571 million. (The
U.S. market for Wi-Fi enabled devices likely accounts for about one-fourth
of the world total.115)  This constitutes a distinct way of calculating benefits
of Wi-Fi applications, of course, but there is nothing to distinguish the
court’s valuation methodology as inferior to that attempted by the spectrum
studies referenced, as the methods of the latter have not separated applica-
tion values from spectrum values.
The 2013 Innovatio Ventures case was the result of an infringement suit
brought by the owner of several patents used in the production of Wi-Fi
routers.116 While the plaintiff was roundly criticized in the tech press as a
“troll,” an opportunistic party attempting to hold-up technology innovators,
the plaintiff won its case and was awarded damages.117 Whatever the merits
of the case or its outcome, the legal proceedings did establish how an inde-
pendent third party – in this case, a federal judge – would think about the
marginal value contributed by Wi-Fi routers overall (and shared by all patent
holders) as well as that proportion of the patent portfolio (with some 3,000
rights) then accruing to the owner of the appropriated rights.
Innovatio, the plaintiff, had attempted to establish various rules of
thumb for Wi-Fi value when Wi-Fi was embedded in devices that were
made more popular by this (wireless) functionality.118 For instance, the com-
pany argued for attributing ten percent of the price of Wi-Fi enabled laptops,
20- 30% of Wi-Fi enabled tablets, and 50% of other wireless devices (where
two radio frequency links were embedded) to the value of Wi-Fi technology
114. KATZ, supra note 97, at 5.
115. This first approximation is made by reference to 2013 global smartphone shipments,
where about 25% were associated with North American countries. See Scott Wilson, Rising
Tide: Exploring Pathways to Growth in the Mobile Semiconductor Industry, DELOITTE UNI-
VERSITY PRESS, fig. 11 (Nov. 6, 2013), http://dupress.com/articles/rising-tide-exploring-path-
ways-to-growth-in-the-mobile-semiconductor-industry/.
116. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2013).
117. Id. at *186.
118. Id. at *73-75.
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(and the base revenue on which it could recover patent fees from manufac-
turers).119 These valuation attempts were deemed “unreliable,”120 a matter of
“speculation,”121 and excluded as “not credible.”122 The court noted that the
ad hoc assignment of gains of given fractions of output prices for devices
using Wi-Fi functionality, over and above input prices paid for Wi-Fi chips,
resulted in wildly inflated valuations. By this reasoning, the court wrote,
“the feature factor of the radio in a car that both transports its occupant and
plays radio would also be 50%, an absurd outcome.”123 By adopting a more
conservative methodology, the court estimated the incremental value of all
U.S. Wi-Fi technology (used in hospital applications, in-home local net-
works, mobile network offload and all else) at about just $150 million annu-
ally for the entire group of patent holders.124 This amounts to less than one
percent of the Thanki (2009) mid-point estimate and just 0.1 percent of what
all “unlicensed applications” were said to be worth in Katz (2014). The large
variance in alternative valuations is evident.
Third, even if the high-end valuations asserted to be generated by wire-
less applications using unlicensed spectrum are compared to the value of
apps hosted in licensed bands, the latter valuations are still much larger.
They are also more likely to reliably reflect consumer surplus levels revealed
in market transactions, and (as suggested with applications using unlicensed
bands) exclude a wide range of additional economic activity. Some esti-
mated values for mobile phone services, observed over the 2008-2014 pe-
riod, are displayed in Table 6. They range from about $200 billion to $500
billion annually. For example, using historic prices, voice minutes of use and
text message levels, Hazlett, Mun˜oz & Avanzini (2012) find that mobile
cellular networks generated about $212 billion in consumer surplus in
2009.125 This valuation included just voice and text service, excluding high-
speed data access, substantially biasing the estimate downwards. The surplus
estimates were calculated from “historic price-quantity pairs [that form]
lower- bound estimates of current conditions with respect to consumer de-
mand.”126 The method yielded “conservative forecasts of the value currently
delivered by wireless network services in the United States.”127
119. Id.
120. Id. at *90.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *93. It may be material to note that two firms prominently supporting research
on valuations of unlicensed spectrum, Microsoft and Google, also participated in the Innovatio
litigation and argued the position largely adopted by the court.
124. See id. at *185-86.
125. Hazlett et al., supra note 55, at 100.
126. Id. at 99.
127. Id.
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The tabulations do not include satellite TV services128 or various other
services deploying licensed spectrum, nor do they capture gains from de-
vices, content, network overlays, public safety, m-health or other
smartphone apps that are supported by carriers with substantial portfolios of
licensed spectrum. This has been noted in a number of studies that, as with
papers attempting to value unlicensed bands, appeal to a vast array of un-
quantified benefits. “The economic and social benefits of wireless broad-
band expand well beyond the provision of mobile services,” write Coleman
Bazelon and Guilia Henry. “Many of these benefits are well beyond the
scope of our estimates above.”129
TABLE 6. ESTIMATED ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
U.S. MOBILE NETWORK SERVICES
Source Period Value ($bil./year) Metric Services
147 (scaled toHazlett 2005 2003 consumer surplus voice2009*)
Entner_ 2008 185 (2005)
mixed productivity value voice, data(CTIA) 427 (as of 2016)
250 (all licensed voice, data,
Thanki 2009 2009 bands, of which 169 various broadcast,
for mobile) satellite, etc.
Hazlett-Munoz- 2009 212 consumer surplus voice, textingAvanzini 2012
Entner 2012 2010 502 consumer surplus voice, data(CTIA)
Bazelon-Henry contribution to2013 200 voice, data2015 (CTIA) GDP
Bazelon-Henry consumer and2013 500 – 1,000 voice, data2015 (CTIA) producer surplus
* THANKI, supra note 84, at 21 (indicating the adjustment).
That there are generally higher valuation estimates associated with ap-
plications relying on licensed spectrum allocations does not decide the rele-
vant policy question, for reasons articulated above. But they do serve to
128. DBS (direct broadcast satellite) serves video to over 30 million U.S. households,
generating about $39 billion in annual revenues. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Com-
petition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 14-16, FCC
15-41 (Fed. Commc’n Comm’n April 2, 2015) (sixteenth report), available at https://apps.fcc
.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-41A1.pdf.
129. COLEMAN BAZELON & GIULIA MCHENRY, MOBILE BROADBAND SPECTRUM: A VI-
TAL RESOURCE FOR THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 22 (May 2015), available at http://www.ctia
.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/brattle_spectrum_051115.pdf; see also Wil-
son, supra note 115 (“Well beyond the immediate confines of the wireless sector, the impact
that 4G will have on non-traditional wireless industries such as commerce, health care, energy,
and automotive is expected to be even more pronounced”).
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counter the opposing categorical argument for additional unlicensed alloca-
tions.  For instance, Thanki (2009) states that its purpose is to rebut the argu-
ment given in Table 7:
TABLE 7. STYLIZED SPECTRUM ALLOCATION ARGUMENT*
The overall value from unlicensed usage Therefore, further licensed allocations of
of spectrum is an insignificant fraction spectrum, especially at lower
of that generated by licensed usage frequencies, will create the most
economic value
* THANKI, supra note 84, at 22.
The inquiry into the value of applications using unlicensed spectrum is
thereby undertaken, with the conclusion rendered that the services supplied
are not “an insignificant fraction of that generated by licensed usage.” In
this, the study aptly critiques the Broadcast TV Spectrum Valuation Fallacy,
and then embraces it. The method pursued then produces valuation estimates
that cannot determine the efficient outcomes they are designed to produce.
MLE (2011), for instance, relies on the empirical findings of Thanki (2009)
to open their argument that “[t]here is considerable evidence that unlicensed
spectrum has huge economic value.”130 The authors go on to argue for addi-
tional unlicensed allocations based on this unilateral claim. Nowhere does
MLE (2011) establish that marginal spectrum allocations are valued more
highly under one regime than the other. It is true that the wireless applica-
tions using unlicensed spectrum generate billions of dollars annually in
value for U.S. consumers. But this fact does not yield the necessary informa-
tion to determine how new increments of bandwidth should be made availa-
ble going forward.
B. Wi-Fi Used for Mobile Data Offloads Presages a Paradigm Shift
While a decided valuation superiority is generally afforded to cellular
network services launched with reliance on licensed spectrum, it is argued
that the market has evolved.  Wireless services delivered to cellular sub-
scribers are now seen to rely mostly on unlicensed spectrum.
[C]ustomers who buy wireless data service from Verizon or AT&T
are not getting their service delivered exclusively over licensed
spectrum. If 92% of data to tablets and 42% of data to handsets is
delivered over Wi-Fi, and customers pay for carriage of bits, not for
“use of spectrum,” a more reasonable approach would be to take the
money customers pay for mobile data carriage and equipment and
apportion it based on the amount of traffic carried.131
130. MILGROM ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
131. Benkler, supra note 7, at 99.
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This approach follows MLE (2011), which offers the view that if half of
U.S. mobile network data traffic is offloaded to fixed networks via WLANs,
then half the value of the service should be attributed to Wi-Fi rather than
the WWAN.132
It is a dubious economic analysis to assign values not based on revealed
demands but on particular attributes singled out by analysts. The analogy
would be to attribute 95% of the value of a diamond ring to the band on
which it is set, based on the fact that the band accounts for that proportion of
its weight. The problem in wireless is seen immediately when considering,
for instance, recent advertisements for Wi-Fi in Buicks. The car comes with
factory-installed WWAN connectivity, which is then distributed to radios
used in the moving vehicle via a WLAN. Since all the traffic will flow
through both the WWAN and the WLAN, the contribution to value is given
(under the bit flow rule) as fifty-fifty, despite the fact that the one opportu-
nity (WWAN connectivity) creates the opportunity of interest and is far
more difficult (costly) to supply. A WWAN connected car without Wi-Fi
could yet generate mobile network access (and for multiple devices using
wires or pico cells, not to mention a Wi-Fi hotspot hosted by a mobile device
untethered from the Buick) while a WLAN connected car without WWAN
access cannot. Valuation for bundled services (here, WWAN and WLAN)
can be arbitrarily apportioned, here by the 50-50 assumption, but the result-
ing valuations are then products of the analyst more than that of the observed
market behavior.
Even this crude proxy rule is calculated asymmetrically. If the value
supplied by $50 billion in expenditures in mobile data service owes $25
billion to Wi-Fi (and then to unlicensed spectrum) on the grounds that half
the bits in question will travel via Wi-Fi, the calculation omits other trans-
mission path metrics. The Wi-Fi router delivers data to and from a fixed
broadband network, encompassing both the last mile facility supplied by an
ISP (such as a telco or cable TV operator) and the longer links forming the
Internet’s network of networks. Cellular base stations, in turn, pass data to
backhaul transport facilities that connect to still larger voice and data net-
works. While cellular operators organize and largely construct these latter
transport paths, the Wi-Fi offload to the fixed network is inexpensive, in
part, because so little additional investment is needed. It is also true that
much of the offload of data from mobile devices to fixed networks, as well
as the cloud, is made via wires – USB power cords that both recharge and
sync Apple devices, for example. While it is impossible to identify the “cor-
rect” calculation that reflects the marginal gains supplied by the associated
132. “A ballpark estimate for the value created by 3G data transmission might be the
data-related revenue of mobile carriers; in 2010, this exceeded $50B. If mobile phone users
use Wi-Fi to transfer roughly half this amount of data, it suggests an annual economic value
being created in excess of $25B.” MILGROM ET AL., supra note 9, at 18.
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networks, it is arbitrary to assert that Wi-Fi deserves a valuation reflecting
the flow of traffic through just two of many more networks.
Indeed, consider accounting for distance in the proxy rule. If the average
Wi-Fi data offload at a residential location or Starbucks hotspot is fifty feet,
and the average mobile data transmission through the cellular network links
through a base station one mile from the device, a 50-50 mix of the traffic
load turns into a 99-1 distance-weighted mix in favor of the cellular network.
It is impossible to document whether this distance-adjusted traffic rule cor-
rectly captures the differential valuations. But it is no more arbitrary than a
value allocation rule that ignores distance variation in the radio frequency
links altogether.
We are not suggesting that this is a good way to approximate the relative
contributions of licensed and unlicensed spectrum in delivering mobile ser-
vices. Quite the reverse: we show how tenuous are the measures, and how
dependent they are on arbitrary assumptions. That comparative valuations
are difficult to infer from physical or technical metrics observed by regula-
tors is why economists have long argued for market mechanisms. It is a
transactional advantage that exclusive rights to spectrum access can be de-
fined, packaged and sold by governments to responsible economic agents.
These agents tend to err less in the construction of valuation metrics and to
be corrected more quickly, given economic incentives to use bandwidth
productively.
This key aspect of efficiency is illustrated in a recent example. With
liberal licenses auctioned by the FCC, 2002-2008, Qualcomm was a buyer.
It won licenses for UHF spectrum formerly set aside for TV broadcasting,
specifically Channel 55.  The company used these rights to launch MediaFlo
in 2007, a service delivering 15-20 video channels (including CNN, CBS,
CNBC, Fox News and Comedy Central) for subscribers. Reception was inte-
grated into handsets sold by AT&T and Verizon, or on stand-alone receivers.
Qualcomm spent over $800 million on the foray, including technology de-
velopment, network broadcast facilities, and FCC licenses.133
By October 2010, however, the company found the innovation unprofit-
able. It was undone. The FCC licenses were sold to AT&T for $1.925 billion
in December 2011.134 The underlying bandwidth was then repurposed to
supply capacity for the wireless carrier’s 4G network, supporting “our goal
133. Stacey Higginbotham, AT&T Goes With the FLO, GIGA OM (May 1, 2008)  https://
gigaom.com/2008/05/01/att-goes-with-the-flo/.
134. AT&T Inc. and Qualcomm Incorporated For Consent To Assign Licenses and Au-
thorizations, WT Docket No. 11-18, FCC 11-188 (Fed. Commc’n Comm’n Dec. 22, 2011)
(order), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-188A1_Rcd.pdf.
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of expanding mobile broadband deployment throughout the country,” in the
words of the FCC.135
As demands for cellular data were growing rapidly, the new foray was
devoted largely to accommodating those demands, driven by the increasing
popularity of mobile video. This illustrates the separation of wireless appli-
cation values from underlying spectrum allocations. TV programs were
broadcast by terrestrial stations accessing the so-called TV Band. MediaFlo,
acquiring liberalized exclusive rights to use those airwaves, broadcast a
package of such video services (and more) to subscribers. Now, through
market-based spectrum reallocation, these video products (and more) are de-
livered by mobile broadband networks. A migration to deployments creating
greater social product over the “TV Band” has occurred. And the flexible
use rights, owned by a profit-maximizing agent, remain ready to be deployed
differently as further opportunities evolve.
The Broadcast TV to Media Flo to 4G spectrum reallocation is not accu-
rately characterized by comparing the popular use of the resulting applica-
tions. Indeed, some might argue that the basic video application has remain
unchanged.136 In another sense, measured “usage” may have declined in the
switch-over from broadcasting to mobile TV. Yet, consumer welfare was
enhanced. The key evidence is found in the market for frequencies.
Qualcomm outbid others for access rights and deployed a profit-motivated
innovation (developing new science in the process). In the event, the innova-
tion flopped, but the effort was productive in transitioning away from a rela-
tively low-valued use (TV broadcasting) and in testing a possible beneficial
innovation. Positive social value was revealed to be associated with the flex-
ible use spectrum property rights, which allowed  spectral  inputs  to  mi-
grate  without  the  hold-ups  routinely delaying  such  transitions in
centralized spectrum allocations.  In the space of about five years, services
supplied on UHF TV Channel 55 were twice liquidated and the bandwidth
repurposed.
We also note the contrast between this experience and what some offer
as a recent success in unlicensed spectrum allocation: TV White Spaces.137
The FCC announced its intention to open this spectrum for unlicensed de-
vices in Dec. 2002.138 Over the ensuing years, FCC-approved white space
135. Eric Engerman & Chris Strohm, AT&T’s $1.93 Billion Qualcomm Airwave
Purchase Wins Approval, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2011-12-22/qualcomm-1-93-billion-airwaves-sale-to-at-t-wins-u-s-approval.
136. Engerman & Strohm, supra note 135 (“AT&T plans to use the new spectrum to help
increase speed of mobile devices as users demand more bandwidth, especially for video and
games.”).
137. See MILGROM ET. AL., supra note 9, at 27; MARTIN SIMS, TOBY YOUELL & RICHARD
WOMERSLEY, UNDERSTANDING SPECTRUM LIBERALISATION 135 (2016).
138. MILGROM ET AL., supra note 9, at 19.
86 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 23:45
devices (WSDs) yield no signs of consumer life.139 As of April 2015, five
years after FCC rules were finalized and over twelve years since the Com-
mission announced its intention to permit WSDs, there were only 538 fixed
wireless radios registered (and thereby approved for use) in the TV Band,
and not a single mobile radio.140
This is not a units error.  There are not 538,000 or 538 million white
spaces devices after a decade and a half of regulatory effort to make abun-
dant TV band spectrum available for their use. There are close to zero. And
there are exactly zero mobile white space devices. The forecast variance of
policy makers is, in this important instance, huge. And despite this lack of
output, the fragmented use rights will tend to block reconfiguration of band
usage anytime soon.
For example, the U-PCS (unlicensed band) at 1915-1920 MHz was allo-
cated in 1993.141 After a decade wherein the bandwidth was idle, with no
wireless devices approved for use by the FCC, regulators began to consider
shifting the bandwidth to flexible use licenses in 2003.142 The reallocation
came to fruition with the auctioning of H-block licenses, allocated 10 MHz
(1915-1920 MHz and 1995-2000 MHz) in February 2014. Revenues re-
ceived summed to about $1.56 billion. The unused U-PCS allocation had
taken about two decades to fix.
Nonetheless, MLE (2011) conclude that the unlicensed TV Band alloca-
tion is socially useful because:
The substantial benefits associated with unlicensed spectrum today,
in particular the large value attributable to ubiquitous technologies
139. “[T]his technology hasn’t seen much deployment,” writes one industry source, call-
ing WSDs “a niche within a niche.” Joan Engebretson, AT&T vs. TV White Spaces: Parsing a
Blog Post, TELECOMPETITOR (April 7, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.telecompetitor.com/att-vs-
tv-white-spaces-parsing-a-blog-post/. It blames the lack of progress on the late availability of
industry standards and that “stakeholders are waiting to see how much TV white spaces spec-
trum is freed up in the upcoming broadcast spectrum incentive auction.” Id. The first asserted
lag is endogenous to the unlicensed approach, as presently constituted, which requires the
government to set spectrum sharing rules and procure bandwidth. The second is misleading, as
the FCC has made it clear that at least about 174 MHz (of the 294 MHz TV Band) will remain
available for broadcasters and WSDs post-auction.
140. See Google Spectrum Database, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/get/spectrum
database/data/ (last visited April 21, 2015); see also National Association of Broadcasters Peti-
tion to Amend Sections 47 C.F.R 15.711(b) and 47 C.F.R 15.717, at 12  (Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n March 19, 2015) (emergency motion for suspension of operations and petition for
rulemaking), available at https://www.nab.org/documents/filings/TVDatabasePetforRulemak-
ing031915.pdf.
141. Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Establish New Personal Communications
Service, Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 7700 (1993).
142. Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission’s Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3
GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services, ET Docket No. 00-258, FCC 03-16, at ¶¶ 46-49 (Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n Feb. 10, 2003) (third report and order), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-16A1.pdf.
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such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, suggest strongly that additional unli-
censed spectrum would continue to contribute to social welfare.143
Overlooking the unjustified leap from asserted infra-marginal perform-
ance to forecast marginal gains, a justification for this assessment is the ex-
trapolation of Wi-Fi capabilities to lower frequencies, as afforded in the TV
band white spaces:
One application is “Super Wi-Fi”, which is expected to increase the
range of Wi-Fi by a factor of two to three as well as allow Wi-Fi to
go over hills and through walls. Super Wi-Fi achieves these benefits
using white spaces – the unused bands of spectrum between used
channels – in the lower frequency television bands between 54 MHz
and 698 MHz.144
Lauded as “wi-fi on steroids,”145 substantial spectrum has been reserved
for the application. Yet, “Super Wi-Fi” at lower frequencies creates chal-
lenges for interference management. Such wide-area coverage with quality
of service guarantees is in fact what cellular systems are designed to achieve.
Relatively sophisticated schemes for centralized interference management
have been widely implemented using licensed spectrum. Non-exclusive
spectrum access regimes have generally proven less supportive.
Meanwhile, were the 174 MHz (or more) reserved for broadcast TV/
white spaces allocated to liberal overlay licenses,146 it is clear that great eco-
nomic gains would ensue. TV station terrestrial transmissions could be
reconfigured or, more completely, moved entirely to cable, satellite, and
broadband delivery platforms. Mobile carriers, bidding over $41 billion for
AWS-3 licenses allocated 65 MHz in the 1.7/2.1 GHz bands in February
2015, reveal substantial demand, at the margin, for exclusive bandwidth.147
Over and above all the opportunities afforded by unlicensed bands allocated
143. MILGROM ET AL., supra note 9, at 19.
144. Id. at 19-20.
145. See Nate Anderson, Wifi on steroids? First “WhiteFi” Prototypes Hit Testing Stage,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 27, 2009, 8:23 AM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2009/08/wifi-on-
steroids-first-whitefi-devices-hit-testing-stage/; see also Nick Valery, White-space Puts Wi-Fi
on Steroids, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21536999.
146. Overlays vest incumbent licensees (in this case, TV stations) with rights to continue
their emissions, but also allow the overlay licensee to buy them out, using the occupied
bandwidth for new applications. Some 174 MHz, or more, will likely be allocated to the TV
Band following the FCC’s Incentive Auction (being held in 2016) in which regulators aim to
reduce the extant 294 MHz allocation (49 TV channels) by as much as 120 MHz. The size of
the post-auction TV Band, we note, will depend on the bids received both by TV stations (in a
reverse auction to sell their licenses back to the government) and by mobile license bidders (in
a forward auction).
147. Federal Communications Commission, Auction of Advanced Wireless Services
(AWS-3) Licenses Closes Winning Bidders Announced for Auction 97, Public Notice DA-15-
131 (Jan. 30, 2015).
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at 900 MHz, 1.9 GHz, 2.4 GHz, 3.65 GHz, 5 GHz and for the TV Band
white space devices, or existing licensed bands, the AWS-3 results reveal
that firms are willing to bid aggressively for additional spectral inputs af-
forded exclusive rights.
Yet, to be clear, the argument here is not that 4G is superior to Wi-Fi as
measured by consumer welfare estimates. The fundamental consideration is
that, with liberal license rights, competitive forces can discover the most
productive uses for bandwidth. MLE (2011) argue that this is impractical,
that transaction costs associated with the aggregation of demands for ser-
vices supplied via unlicensed bands demands are prohibitive.148 We turn to
that discussion just below.
Before doing so, however, we note an important admission. That gov-
ernment spectrum allocation is said to be necessary for unlicensed spectrum
to operate is to attach the costs of “command and control” to such alloca-
tions. Alternatives are available; with liberal licenses, control over bands is
delegated to institutions that operate without the administrative handicaps,
transactional expense, and rent-seeking that accompany the top-down FCC
spectrum allocation regime. This is a crucial consideration in any institu-
tional comparison of rival approaches, one that is often – incorrectly – as-
sumed away (although it is articulated in Benjamin [2003]).149
C. Auctions Cannot Assign Unlicensed Rights Given
Demand Aggregation Costs
In an intriguing and provocative 2008 FCC paper, economists Mark
Bykowsky, Mark Olson, and William Sharkey created and tested an auction
format designed to allocate spectrum across licensed and unlicensed re-
gimes.150 Their approach allowed companies desiring access to exclusive ac-
cess rights to bid against firms wanting additional bandwidth for unlicensed
devices.151 The trick was, while letting every bidder state a price it would
pay for the rights being assigned by the regulator, bids for unlicensed fre-
quency use would be aggregated in a common pot. This reflected the fact
that, post auction, all such bidders would benefit from access to the unli-
censed band, realizing the gain that their bids were made to capture.
Hence, if four licenses, each allocated 20 MHz of spectrum space, were
offered for sale and the top four bids (say, $5 billion, $4 billion, $3 billion,
$2 billion) received were from firms seeking exclusive licenses, the four
firms would each win one license. Unless, that is, additional bids for unli-
148. MILGROM ET AL., supra note 9, at 5-6.
149. See Stuart M. Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and
Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003).
150. Mark M. Bykowsky, Mark A. Olson & William W. Sharkey, A Market-based Ap-
proach to Establishing Licensing Rules: Licensed Versus Unlicensed Use of Spectrum 2 (Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, Working Paper No. 43, 2008).
151. Id. at 4-7.
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censed bandwidth were received that totaled more than $2 billion – say,
three bids of $800 million each. These bids, jointly, would win the fourth
block ($2.4 billion out-bidding $2 billion), moving the allocated 20 MHz
into an unlicensed allocation. In laboratory testing, using experimental eco-
nomics techniques, the authors found that the bidding scheme was largely
successful in producing efficient allocations, although some free riding
emerged with respect to unlicensed bids. Individual firms in the consortium
favoring an unlicensed allocation would tend to under-bid their true values
in hopes other firms’ would carry more of the burden (paying more to sup-
port the unlicensed band). This problem emanated from the particulars of the
auction design assumed, however, wherein the use of the unlicensed spec-
trum would be established not by contract between the bidding partners but
by the FCC. Clearly, alternative forms are available: bidders can agree to
share certain benefits from a successful bid to reward those parties according
to their investments. This was the structure of consortium bidding for FCC
licenses by SpectrumCo, a bidding group composed of four cable TV com-
panies, in the 2006 AWS- 1 auction. The partnership won access rights to
about 20 MHz nationwide for winning bids totaling $2.4 billion. 152 Of
course, device-licensing agreements can also be used, as proposed in Kwerel
& Williams 2002153, with rates adjusted to protect the interests of license
auction bidders.
The FCC has yet to adopt the Bykowsky-Olson-Sharkey spectrum allo-
cation plan.154 One argument against it is that it is unnecessary, and unduly
complicated, for the auctioneer to aggregate bids. As noted, consortia are
allowed to bid under existing rules.  Rather than redesigning auction struc-
tures, public policy might be better served by eliminating regulatory barriers
to the supply of “unlicensed” bandwidth by licensees. For instance, build-out
requirements are often imposed as license terms. These mandate that auction
winners quickly invest in complementary network infrastructure, imposing
deadlines – say, 50% geographic coverage in two years, 70% in three years,
etc. Yet, if unlicensed bands are the objective, the traditional network build-
out may be moot, and rules requiring it may block competition in business
models, some of which may supply “naked spectrum” for “plug ‘n play”
devices. Perhaps the build-out requirement could be stricken altogether, or
replaced by an alternative requirement that the bandwidth associated with
the FCC license be “productively managed.”
152. Paul Milgrom, Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin, Winning Play in Spectrum Auc-
tions 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14765, 2009).
153. Kwerel & Williams, supra note 51, at 31.
154. A proposal by Congressman Greg Walden (R-OR), the Spectrum Innovation Act of
2011, would have created legislation to implement this idea. The bill was not enacted, how-
ever. See Matthew Lasar, Congress Goes After Unlicensed Wireless “Free Riders” (like
Google and Microsoft), ARS TECHNICA (July 14, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2011/07/republican-spectrum-bill-reins-in-wireless-free-riders-like-google/.
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Even if a new bid-stacking auction format is unnecessary, the idea of
using auctions to allocate spectrum access rights across regimes is a very
helpful contribution. The FCC analysts pinpoint the basic informational
problem plaguing regulators who “designate[s] spectrum to either licensed
use or unlicensed operations. . . through an administrative process.”155 Not-
ing that the European Commission has condemned that process as “neither
transparent nor objective,”156 and that a prominent British economist has
deemed it “arbitrary and unsatisfactory,”157 policy makers are forced to rely
on “the reported needs of interested parties.”158 Auctions help by “reducing
the incentive that parties have to exaggerate. . .  creating a market for such
rules in which participants bid to have their license rule needs met.159“
The bids registered for additional rights not only discipline the claims
made by rival parties but define marginal values which are not evident by
merely observing extant spectrum uses. Noting that truthful demand revela-
tion invokes “incentive problems” discussed in economic theory,160 they rec-
ommend competitive bidding to “substantially improve the efficiency of the
licensing process and, thus, the economic benefit society receives from one
of its most valuable resources.”161
MLE respond to the Bykowsky et al. auction approach, dismissing it as
unworkable due to a public good problem with unlicensed spectrum. They
note that “[a]uction markets work best when one can identify the relevant
bidders in advance, bring them to the auction, inform them about what is for
sale, and motivate them to bid.”162 But given the “diverse and evolving
group of devices that use and benefit from unlicensed spectrum” – including
computers, mobile phones, baby monitors and garage door openers – “and
the millions of consumers that use them,” the set of potential “beneficiaries
is too large and diverse to be identified, informed and motivated to bid.”163
This rationale for government set-asides of unlicensed spectrum fails on
multiple counts. It ignores how auctions for wireless services demonstrably
work. Moreover, an asserted market failure is asymmetrically applied and is
then used to advance a policy solution that exhibits as much or more of the
informational problem cited as justification.
155. Bykowsky et al., supra note 150, at 25-26.
156. MOTT MACDONALD LTD., ET AL., STUDY OF LEGAL ECONOMIC & TECHNICAL AS-
PECTS OF ‘COLLECTIVE USE’ OF SPECTRUM IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 14 (2006), available
at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/sites/digital-agenda/files/cus_rep_fin.pdf.
157. Martin Cave, New Spectrum-Using Technologies and the Future of Spectrum Man-
agement: a European Policy Perspective, in COMMUNICATIONS: THE NEXT DECADE 220, ed-
ited by Ed Richards, Robin Foster and Tom Kiedrowski, Ofcom (Nov. 2006), at 224.
158. Bykowsky et al., supra note 150, at 26.
159. Bykowsky et al., supra note 150, at 26.
160. Id., at 2.
161. Id. (emphasis original).
162. MILGROM ET AL., supra note 9, at 25.
163. Id.
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The asserted lack of informed bidders among a “large and diverse”
group of unidentified beneficiaries is also present in other markets where
auctions work well.164 For example, auctions for oil, timber or mineral rights
seek to procure inputs that will be sold, years hence, to large numbers of
disparate customers. The uncertainties are routinely addressed by the emer-
gence of agents who specialize in gaining information about future demands,
how best to predict them, and how to efficiently aggregate them. Capital
goods, in particular, are created by investors who inevitably make judgments
about demands, costs, technology and substitutes years well into the future.
These data are widely dispersed throughout the economy and materially im-
pact risk premiums across investments.
When mobile operators acquire exclusive spectrum access rights, they
act on behalf of “millions of consumers,” as well as device makers, app
developers, and content creators, all of whom may benefit from the networks
that result. Sprint’s PCS licenses purchased in FCC Auction No. 4, con-
cluded in March 1995, today host valuable wireless services for tens of mil-
lions of subscribers who were entirely unknown to the initial corporate
bidders, including many who were not yet born.  When Apple sold $30 bil-
lion worth of iPhones to Sprint in 2012, the device maker likewise reaped
gains from Sprint’s 1995 bids, despite the fact that the creation of the iconic
smartphone was more than a decade in the future.
Even were there a market failure to remedy (i.e., a lack of informed
bidders), the information problem cited exists for government regulators as
well as private firms. Replacing auctions with administrative allocations
does not reveal the missing information but forecloses whatever relevant
data would be supplied by the demands that organized bidding would reveal.
This approach exacerbates information problems by making the demands
(exercised now by government regulators) less explicit or transparent.
In fact, government does act as an agent for future beneficiaries in set-
ting aside spectrum bands, however regulated. It may do so in a competitive
or monopolistic environment. In the former, the state openly bids against
rival parties for resources; in the latter, it pre-empts competing bids and
operates unilaterally. The unilateral approach is less transparent and consti-
tutes “Gosplan” (Faulhaber & Farber 2003)165 so widely criticized by ana-
lysts and regulators themselves. To the degree that spectrum allocations are
plagued by the absence of key information, eliminating competing demands
intensifies the failure.
The argument is given that spectrum needs to be allocated by the FCC
for unlicensed allocations, just as public parks are set aside for non-commer-
164. See generally PAUL MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004).
165. Gerald Faulhaber, The Future of Wireless Telecommunications: Spectrum as a Crit-
ical Resource, 18 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 256, 265 (2006).
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cial use by local, state or federal governments.166 The analogy of possible
set-asides (one in land, the other in spectrum) holds. But the allocational
process is distinct. In real estate, there exists no “Federal Land Commis-
sion”167 or “Federal Land-Use Commission.168  Society distributes property
rights by competitive bidding. Resource uses are determined by decentral-
ized owners, who seek to maximize value. Assets are not held back as regu-
lators, who do not internalize the costs from inefficient choices, decide how
to allocate them across competing demands. The market largely performs
this task with private firms, individuals, and non-profit organizations (in-
cluding governments) buying and selling.
In that process opportunity costs are revealed. Governments, or other
parties, do not acquire rights for which they are unwilling to outbid rivals.169
In order to divert marginal increments of property to the provision of public
parks, a monetary decision must be made. Costs can be readily discerned.
This relative transparency facilitates rational decision making.  When the
state pre-empts competitive bidding to requisition and quarantine spectrum
for a particular application, it sacrifices available information- generating
mechanisms.
This reprises the original debate on government allocation of bandwidth
when FCC Chief Economist Dallas Smythe squared off against University of
Chicago law student Leo Herzel in 1952. 170 Smythe countered Herzel’s pro-
posal for assigning spectrum rights by auction with a rhetorical barb:
“Surely, it is not seriously intended that noncommercial radio users (such as
police). . . . should compete with dollar bids against the broadcast users for
channel allocations.”171 Herzel responded: “Why is it seriously suggested
that they shouldn’t compete for radio frequencies?”172 The fact was that each
deployment would exclude other opportunities. Noting the “illusory comfort
of free service” and the convenience of “being saved from the self-knowl-
edge of what such services cost,” Herzel adroitly demolished the idea that
bidding was inappropriate in socially important wireless services, including
those associated with public safety.173 The Herzel logic was so compelling –
166. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra note 4.
167. Coase et al. (1995), supra note 23, at 80.
168. Lawrence J. White, “Propertyzing” the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It’s Impor-
tant and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA LAW AND POL’Y 19, 38-40 (2000).
169. This includes, by virtue of eminent domain law, arrangements wherein governments
are given means to mitigate certain transaction (and hold-up) costs. Because condemnation
requires “just compensation,” governments are forced to make price-based trade-offs with re-
spect to takings, mimicking a bidding situation stripped of opportunistic hold-up. See generally
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985).
170. Leo Herzel, Facing the Facts about the Broadcast Business: Rejoinder, 20 U. CHI.
L. REV. 106, 106-07 (1952).
171. Id.
172. Herzel, supra note 170, at 106.
173. Id.
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and the arguments against it so “incredibly feeble” – that it convinced Ron-
ald Coase of the superiority of markets over administrative allocations.174
D. Unlicensed Bands Exhibit Lower Transactions Costs
With property rights, there are costs to defining, enforcing, and trading
ownership interests.175 Where society does not gain sufficient benefit to off-
set these costs, rights will typically not be so defined. Open Access, where
rules to limit resource appropriation are not in effect, will then be more
efficient.
In addition to private property rights, “spectrum commons” or unli-
censed bands, also require costly rules.176  But these are frequently over-
looked in favor of a categorical claim that non-exclusive use rights eliminate
transaction costs because they may be used “without having to negotiate
permission from spectrum owners.”177 In fact, devices accessing unlicensed
bands must be authorized by regulators. That process may take years, as in
the TV white spaces proceeding. And once permission is granted, case-by-
case or in the form of type acceptance (a standards-based approval allowing
innovation in certain dimensions) the imposed limits create “transaction
costs” by blocking a range of otherwise useful technologies, services, or
applications. Benkler concludes that U-PCS was an “outright failure,”178 and
the 3650 MHz unlicensed allocation initiative “largely anemic.”179 Such out-
comes reflect transaction costs that hinder more successful forms of coordi-
nation. When the U-PCS experience is contrasted with the robust market
outcomes in cellular services utilizing auctioned PCS licenses, it is clear, at
least in some instances, “having to negotiate permission from spectrum own-
ers” may help to economize on transaction costs.180
MLE posit that “[unlicensed spectrum] provides a platform for innova-
tion upon which innovators may face lower barriers to bringing wireless
products to market, because they are freed from the need to negotiate with
174. See Ronald H. Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239, 249
(1993).
175. Demsetz, supra note 28, at 10-13.
176. While the term “spectrum commons” is used to describe unlicensed bands, the insti-
tution is generally a better fit with a regime of State Property. That is because the governance
rules established to limit conflicts between resource users are set not by spectrum owners,
holding rights privately or in common (say, as a corporation or a consortium), but by regula-
tors. These rules encompass power limits, technology restrictions, and other technical rules
(determining fixed v. mobile use, e.g., or what emissions can be conducted indoors v. out-
doors). That said, property rights, as applied, contain a mix of attributes. “Real property re-
gimes are more complex than the open access, private property, common property, and state
property discussions suggest.”  Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in 1 HAND-
BOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 183, 198 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
177. Benkler, supra note 7, at 89.
178. Id. at 72.
179. Id. at 100.
180. Id. at 89.
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exclusive license holders.”181 They further declare that “unlicensed spectrum
can make the cost of setting up and deploying systems for local wireless
transmission extremely low. There are no licensing fees to pay, no approvals
to obtain, and no need for radio frequency planning.”182 Whether or not this
creates net benefits is not established, however, because the rules place on
unlicensed are not themselves free. They may burden the marketplace with
administrative delays, or block useful innovations, or foreclose productive
coordination efforts.
Conversely, the idea that unlicensed allocations inevitably lower trans-
action costs fails to appreciate existing market institutions. Mobile subscrib-
ers, for example, commonly pay to access privately held spectrum rights via
subscriptions. Likewise, vendors manufacture hundreds of wireless devices
that access frequencies in bargains (including technical certification) with
carriers. Because exclusive rights owners internalize the costs (as well as
benefits) from promoting use of their assets, they seek to create efficient
contractual forms. One observed outcome is that subscribers, as part of a
standard mobile service agreement, gain the right to roam on hundreds of
carriers’ networks world-wide. This demonstrates how “negotiations” to ac-
cess privately held airwave rights may be achieved in bulk, at relatively low
unit cost.
There is no doubt that private property rights can, in particular instances,
lead to hold-out problems or monopoly pricing. The policy approaches gen-
erally used to mitigate these anti-social outcomes involve, first, distributing
rights that are not overly fragmented and can be efficiently used or traded
(see discussion just below on tragedy of the anti-commons), and in promot-
ing economic competition. The existence of market rivalry leads firms with
spectrum rights to more actively pursue negotiations for access. When Ap-
ple, for instance, began its initiative to create an iPhone, it first approached
Verizon, a large U.S. mobile carrier, to sponsor the effort (and to host its
devices). When Verizon’s demands were deemed excessive by Apple, more
favorable offers were put forward by competing carriers Sprint and AT&T,
the latter winning the right to sell the iPhone (exclusively in the U.S. for
over three years). The rivalry between network platforms is actively moni-
tored by regulators, of course, which block mergers (as in the proposed
AT&T/T-Mobile merger in 2011), give auction bidding preferences to en-
trants, and limit license aggregations so as to pre-empt the emergence of
undue market power. In addition to preserving competitive forces, it is also
possible for policy makers to use eminent domain to overcome transaction
cost problems associated with excessive fragmentation. Such takings are
used, with real property, to overcome hold-outs. Importantly, “just compen-
181. MILGROM ET AL., supra note 9, at 2.
182. Id. at 15.
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sation” is paid to appropriated owners, a mechanism for mimicking the price
system and revealing the total costs of the resources used.
On the other hand, a broad consensus holds that state property – as with
spectrum assignments given to the military or other public sector depart-
ments – is particularly subject to misallocation by externality.183 Hence, the
idea that transaction costs exist in the use of exclusive ownership rights is
not wrong, but if asymmetrically applied – as in MLE (2011) – it creates
precisely the analytical error embedded in Pigou’s “welfare economics,”
which Coase (1960) aimed to correct.184
One way to think about transaction costs associated with the use of li-
censed spectrum is to examine the sales of radios in the burgeoning
smartphone market. U.S. revenue data for 2005-2015 are displayed in Figure
2, indicating that over $50 billion in sales were registered in 2015. Every
smartphone sold in the U.S. is embedded with RF chips to access frequen-
cies allocated to licenses held by U.S. (and other) carriers. Each smartphone
vendor must secure permission rights from these carriers. Not only are these
rights secured so as to enable mass-market product distribution, but substan-
tial infrastructure (securing base stations, backhaul facilities, and network
connectivity), making the spectrum in question more valuable to
customers.185
Not only are tens of millions of such phones sold in the U.S. each year,
virtually each one is equipped – by contract – to access the airwaves con-
trolled by a competing carrier. Contracts include pre-paid and post-paid;
some are bundled with the phone sale, while others are executed separately
(with an “unlocked” device). The transactions are not prohibitively expen-
sive, but routine.
FIG. 2. U.S. SMARTPHONE SALES, 2005-2015 (SOURCE: STATISTA)
183. CAVE, supra note 29, at 101.
184. See generally Coase, supra note 25.
185. Roger Entner, Every Way You Look At It: US Carriers Spend More In Capex Than
Their EU Peers, RECON ANALYTICS (June 9, 2014), http://reconanalytics.com/2014/06/every-
way-you-look-at-it-us-carriers-spend-more-in-capex-than-their-eu-peers/.
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Transaction costs associated with licensed spectrum do not appear to
pre-empt other aspects of ecosystem development either. Apple’s App Store
and Google’s Google Play offer hundreds of thousands of software programs
for subscribers of mobile services, generating billions of downloads – over
100 billion for Apple alone since 2008,186 and at least $26 billion in annual
(non-advertising) revenues for the Apple App Store plus  Google  Play
(linked  to  the  Android  smartphone  operating system) in 2015.187 This ec-
onomic activity reveals that mobile carriers, application platforms, and third
party developers have coordinated complementary pursuits. The direct pay-
out to these software application creators, focusing just on the Apple iOS
and Google Android platforms, totaled about $18 billion in 2015. (Develop-
ers receive a standard 70% share of download revenues.188) This rapidly
evolving market suggests that transactions are not hindered, relative to rea-
sonable alternatives, by mobile networks’ reliance on licensed spectrum.
Not only can transactions using exclusive frequency rights be seen to
yield robust economic outcomes, but the lack of such can visibly deter pro-
ductive investment. LightSquared, an innovative firm that attempted to intro-
duce a new 4G LTE national network to compete with incumbent mobile
operators by sharing L-Band satellite 1.6 GHz frequencies,189 is an excellent
example.
Originally, regulators allocated the L Band for satellite services, includ-
ing telephony.190 But such deployments were expensive and attracted only
scant demand.  Satellite service providers went through a series of bankrupt-
cies (involving both L Band and other FCC licenses).  By the early 2000s,
regulators were persuaded to allow holders of these licenses the freedom to
supply – along with the satellite links that their licenses authorized – land
mobile services using standard cellular architectures.191 While the FCC con-
tinued to require that satellite services be supplied, according to the terms of
the licenses, an ATC – “ancillary terrestrial component” – was added, per-
mitting direct competition to existing mobile networks.192
186. Cumulative Number of Apps Downloaded from the Apple App Store from July 2008
to September 2016 (in billions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/263794/number-
of-downloads-from-the-apple-app-store/ (last updated Sept. 2016).
187. Projected Google Play Revenue from 2014 to 2019 (in billion U.S. dollars),
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/444476/google-play-annual-revenue/ (last up-
dated Mar. 2015); Annual Apple App Store revenue in 2013 and 2015 (in billion U.S. dollars),
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/296226/annual-apple-app-store-revenue/ (last up-
dated Jan. 2016).
188. Tim Mackenzie, App Store Fees, Percentages, and Payouts: What Developers Need
to Know, TECHREPUBLIC (May 7, 2012, 6:03 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/
software-engineer/app-store-fees-percentages-and-payouts-what-developers-need-to-know/.
189. Sam Churchill, LightSquared Files Official FCC Rep., DAILY WIRELESS (June 30,
2011), http://www.dailywireless.org/2011/06/30/lightsquared-files-official-fcc-report.
190. See Hazlett & Skorup, supra note 49, at 2.
191. Id. at 2-3.
192. Id.
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Initially, however, this liberalization was of little use.  The satellite li-
censes had been issued to multiple satellite operators, and their spectrum
assignments were interleaved.193 This meant that, while considerable
bandwidth – at least 40 MHz in the L Band – was endemically under-uti-
lized and theoretically available for new deployments, the too-numerous
borders created spillovers that rendered valuable services such as LTE pro-
hibitively expensive. But, in time, deals were made among the licensees.
Lightsquared made its L Band licenses more valuable by paying other licen-
sees to trade assignments. Spectrum rights were rationalized. As the Com-
mission noted, in approving the license transfers, the band could not have
supported 4G technologies if the private bargains had not delivered a coop-
erative solution making large, contiguous blocks of spectrum available.
With cellular networks booming and the smartphone revolution spurring
even greater demands for mobile data services, Lightsquared began invest-
ing billions of dollars to construct its nationwide wireless network.  But the
emerging project was abruptly thwarted in 2012. Regulators, reacting to an
interference dispute over GPS radios, which are assigned to use adjacent
frequencies, revoked previous LightSquared ATC authorizations. As shown
in Hazlett & Skorup (2014), the social gains from additional LTE competi-
tion were likely in the tens of billions of dollars, with costs (upgrading GPS
receivers and deploying filters to limit emission spillovers) only a small frac-
tion of the sum.194 With no responsible agent able to negotiate with Light-
Squared, however, gains from trade could not be executed. The source of
this quagmire was a principal-agent problem stemming from the mix of li-
censed and unlicensed rights strewn about the GPS band. Due to the pres-
ence of overlapping use rights issued in large numbers, the transaction costs
of negotiating with interested parties (GPS users and the firms supplying
radios), were prohibitive, frustrating a productive transition.
The FCC bent to the protests of powerful GPS incumbents – including
airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration and the U.S. Department of
Defense – arguing for a halt in LightSquared’s 4G network. Blair Levin, the
head of the FCC’s 2009-10 National Broadband Plan Task Force, which had
projected that 40 MHz of L Band spectrum would be released to the market
by 2015, characterized the regulatory choice (to protect GPS by effectively
making adjacent frequencies a guard band) thusly:
Something extraordinary happened last week. Our country reallo-
cated 40 MHz of commercial spectrum. No Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking from the FCC. No notice and comment period. No eco-
193. Id. at 20.
194. See id. at 1.
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nomic analysis. Not even a legal decision stating that that is what
we are doing.195
Billions of dollars in annual gains were possible. But due to the truncated
GPS Band use rights, fragmentary and non-exclusive, “negotiations” were
only possible through the FCC. These agents do not internalize efficiency
gains, but are highly sensitive with respect to political pressure. As Levin
describes:
Through a complicated process—mostly out of the public eye—of
K St. machinations, inter-agency battles, and congressional pres-
sure, we as a country came to the unstated but clear conclusion that
the GPS industry has a primary right to use the spectrum in the band
owned by LightSquared.196
The view that exclusive ownership rights are costly (which is true) and
that non-exclusive ownership rights supervised by regulators are free (which
is false) flows from an asymmetric set of assumptions. That asymmetry
leads to policy confusion, as demonstrated in MLE (2011)’s criticism of lib-
eral licenses:
Another drawback to property rights is that they can stifle third-party
innovation: third-party innovators face a threat of hold-up. A company that
comes up with a new mobile device or business model needs to convince the
owner of the spectrum to let it develop its idea, and it may have to share a
large fraction of the value that is created with the spectrum owner. If the new
development threatens the owner’s existing business, it is particularly un-
likely to be allowed. And, if the innovation requires the assent and coordina-
tion of multiple spectrum owners, it is even more difficult to get the owners
all to agree. The potential for this type of coordination failure is sometimes
referred to as the tragedy of the anticommons.197
The passage relies on one set of asserted failures, for which it gives no
examples. It ignores other “coordination failures” including the Light-
Squared debacle, U-PCS, 3650 MHz and TV Band white spaces. But most
interestingly, it includes a citation to Michael Heller’s classic 1998 article in
the HARVARD LAW REVIEW, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in
the Transition from Marx to Markets. The essay described how, in post-
Communist Moscow, resources that were privately owned nonetheless sat
195. Blair Levin, Fellow, Aspen Inst., Remarks to the Minority Media & Telecommuni-
cation Council (Mar. 8, 2012).
(Mar. 8, 2012).
196. Id. It should be noted that Levin’s claim that the controversy was over a “a band
owned by LightSquared” is ironic in the extreme. The basis of the FCC’s action that Levin
objects to was that LightSquared did not “own” the band but was licensed to use it according
to the agency’s determination of “public interest” – which could (and did) change.
197. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622 (1998).
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idle. The reason was that ownership rights may not be productively em-
ployed if owned by too many different parties.198 The policy solution to the
problem dubbed “tragedy of the anti-commons” was to avoid rights frag-
mentation. The article did not apply the analysis to problems of spectrum
allocation.
Ten years later, however, Heller wrote a book that did. In his 2008, THE
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY, Heller spent a chapter on the topic. There he wrote
that unlicensed bands generate transaction cost problems that can be largely
remedied by exclusive, liberal spectrum rights. He took pains to note that
“unlicensed spectrum can’t operate outside of the law of commons trag-
edy.”199 He illustrated: “You and all your neighbors might be happy to sell
your rights to garage-door opener spectrum and get in exchange access to
some next-generation technology. . . But in a spectrum commons, there is no
way to make that deal.”200 The lost opportunities may be unnoticed, as “the
gridlock side of unlicensed spectrum remains invisible.”201
There is little question that flexible use wireless licenses played a key
role in enabling 2G, 3G and 4G network build-outs, triggering complemen-
tary investments in devices, apps, and content. This causative pattern – mo-
bile licenses are issued, networks are built to complement the value of the
spectrum allotted to such licenses, other elements of the ecosystem are con-
structed around these emergent platforms – is considered obvious in market
analyses. Despite widespread consensus, it is possible to debate this conclu-
sion and the premises on which it is based. But it is clearly wrong to assert
that the existence of transaction costs in the use of licensed spectrum is a
unique factor that categorically imposes tragedy of the anti-commons. To be
compelling, arguments to divert spectrum allocations from too costly forms
of ownership require far more empirical granularity and must consider the
alternatives.
198. The key is complementarity. With the Heller example, to productively use a build-
ing, an entrepreneur would need to aggregate the land rights, the ownership of the lobby,
ownership of the elevator and/or stairwell, ownership of individual apartments or offices;
rights to collect rents, rights to remodel, etc. In buying and aggregating such rights, one owner
could hold-out, striving to extract the full value of any new investment by exercising veto
rights (as any one owner of highly complementary rights can block a project). But then all
owners have similar incentives. Bargaining breaks down. The anti-social outcome was the
product of both a communist system, where rights were assigned to myriad parties, and a
haphazard transition to capitalist ownership. In a more rational legal structure, rights would not
be so fragmented and, therefore, difficult to optimize.
199. Heller, supra note 197, at 86.
200. Id. at 85.
201. Id.
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E. Unlicensed Bands are Supplanting Licensed Bands in Terms of Utility
The idea that WLANs using Wi-Fi may largely supplant WWANs rely-
ing on licensed spectrum is a running theme in Benkler.202 The premise is
used to support the policy conclusion that unlicensed spectrum allocations
should be increased. But if the market premise is correct, the policy implica-
tion does not follow. The claim that more bandwidth would better accommo-
date additional unlicensed spectrum use reveals that scarcity still remains, no
matter numerous claims made previously,203 and that valued opportunities
are still sacrificed by allocating more spectrum for one set of employments
versus another. These social costs need be accounted for to achieve a ra-
tional use of resources, and the information supplied by prices established in
competitive spectrum transactions thus remains socially valuable.
Benkler points to the 2011 market entry by Republic Wireless as em-
blematic of the shift to unlicensed spectrum.204 Republic, held by a private
firm that does not disclose subscriber counts but which in 2014 claimed a
customer base “in the healthy six figures,”205 offers low-cost mobile phone
service by relying on a “Wi-Fi first” strategy. A subscriber making a voice
call or data connection will be directed to a fixed network via Wi-Fi; if that
is unavailable, the requested link is provided by a mobile network. In Re-
public’s case, the network is Sprint’s, which contracts with some 130 mobile
virtual network operators like Republic.206 Other MVNOs are attempting
similar strategies, including an entry by Google (using both T-Mobile and
Sprint mobile networks). Benkler argues that Wi-Fi-over-unlicensed is com-
peting with and purportedly eclipsing mobile-over-licensed, which is used as
a backup. The reverse could be claimed, of course: mobile operators are
enabling use of Wi-Fi hotspots.207
From the beginning, mobile networks have been constructed and oper-
ated with a mix of wires and wireless assets, utilizing fixed and mobile com-
ponents. As has been joked, “mobile networks are actually stationary – it’s
the subscriber who moves.” To the extent that WLAN nodes accessing unli-
censed bands are increasingly helpful in bringing wireless subscribers to the
fixed network, the evolution of the network architecture continues. Yet, to
make efficient choices in the allocation of resources, options must be valued.
Should additional unlicensed bandwidth be configured to protect local Wi-Fi
202. See Benkler, supra note 7.
203. Benjamin, supra note 149, at 2010, 2046.
204. Benkler, supra note 7, at 106.
205. Scott Moritz & Olga Kharif, Wi-Fi Phone Upstarts Lure Penny Pinchers from Ver-
izon, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 3, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-03-03/wi-fi-phone-upstarts-lure-penny-pinchers-from-verizon.
206. Id.
207. We note the irony that, whereas scholars such as Tim Wu argued that mobile opera-
tors were suppressing access to Wi-Fi for anti-competitive reasons, a new argument has
emerged that mobile carriers are facilitating Wi-Fi access. See Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1
INT’L J. COMM. 389 (2007).
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traffic, to economize on WLAN nodes, or to accommodate mobile offload?
While the relevant prices for Wi-Fi equipment and licensed spectrum inputs
are obtained in the market, the opportunity costs of unlicensed are not.
Prices remain invisible as per public policy.
The emergence of carriers such as Republic Wireless do not imply that
licensed frequencies are becoming passe´. The fact that Wi-Fi can be used to,
on some margins, compete with services using licensed spectrum leads to
comparisons that reveal how useful exclusive access rights can be. In fact,
Republic is tiny relative to its rivals.208 Moreover, it competes in the market
by buying wholesale service from existing operators using licensed spec-
trum. Whatever the advantages of piggybacking on fixed networks via  Wi-
Fi connections, the advantages of mobility, using licensed frequencies, re-
main highly valued. Only five percent of Republic’s subscribers are Wi-Fi
only.209
The premise of the argument that Wi-Fi is eclipsing mobile cellular is
rejected by regulators who do not believe the networks provide the same
product. Both the FCC and U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division
have found that WWANs and WLANs inhabit distinct product markets. In
considering the proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile (the second and
fourth largest wireless carriers) in 2011,210 antitrust authorities defined the
product market to include the four national U.S. cellular carriers (the merg-
ing parties plus Verizon and Sprint). Wi-fi hotspot services, networks, or
“Wi-Fi first” MVNOs were excluded.211 A similar determination was made
by sector regulators.212
It may serve a rhetorical strategy to characterize Wi-Fi access as pri-
mary and mobile access as secondary, but the theme is undermined by com-
mon use of the term “Wi-Fi offload.” And increasing use of Wi-Fi is driven
by the complementarity with licensed spectrum use. AT&T offers mobile
service to about 120 million U.S. subscribers, incorporating its more than
208. Verizon and AT&T each have well over 100 million subscribers. See Mike Dano,
How Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, Sprint and More Stacked up in Q2 2016: The Top 7 Carriers,
FIERCEWIRELESS (Aug. 15, 2016, 4:08 PM), http://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/how-ver-
izon-at-t-t-mobile-sprint-and-more-stacked-up-q2-2016-top-7-carriers.
209. See Sarah Thomas, Republic Welcomes More WiFi-First Action, LIGHT READING
(Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.lightreading.com/mobile/carrier-wifi/republic-welcomes-more-
wifi-first-action/d/d-id/713530.
210. The government filed suit to block the merger, which was then abandoned.
211. See Complaint at 2, United States v. AT&T et al., No. 1: 11-cv-01560 (D.D.C. Aug.
31, 2011).
212. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, WT DOCKET NO. 11-65, STAFF ANALYSIS AND FIND-
INGS IN APPLICATION OF AT&T FOR TRANSFER OF T-MOBILE USA LICENSES, at 19-20 (2011),
available at https://www.natoa.org/policy-advocacy/FCCStaffReportATTMerger.pdf.
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30,000 hotspots,213 at least 50,000 cell sites,214 and 40,000 “small cells.”215
At the same time, the firm bid $18 billion in early 2015 to acquire rights for
marginal bandwidth, specifically 20 MHz of AWS3 frequencies.216 This re-
vealed preference for exclusive rights provides direct evidence of the value
of the marginal product of licensed spectrum.
The price data revealed in market bidding, which occurs in primary and
secondary market transactions where exclusive, flexible rights are ex-
changed, is itself valuable. Under current regulatory procedures, however,
prices for additional unlicensed bandwidth are held at zero, distorting
choices. Not only is demand revelation sacrificed, it incentivizes rent seek-
ing, a socially expensive competition for wealth transfers.
Currently, for instance, Comcast and General Motors plead with regula-
tors to side with them (and against their rival) in the use of unlicensed 5.9
GHz frequencies. Under existing rules, the permitted applications favor ve-
hicle telematics, including those used in collision-avoidance and driverless
cars. Under proposals put forth by Comcast and other parties, at least some
of the 100 MHz band would be made available for WLAN Wi-Fi use (ex-
tending the 5.8 GHz band).217 Automakers argue “safety first,” and warn that
reducing the extant allocation would endanger lives. Champions of addi-
tional unlicensed bandwidth for Wi-Fi argue that new services could be fa-
cilitated while having de minimus impact on car safety. Moreover, the 5.9
GHz auto telematics allocation has been in place for many years and yet car
companies have made scant use of it. As one writer explains: “Nobody is
saying that better access to YouTube videos should take precedence over
life-saving technology. But tech companies argue that a network of con-
nected cars is still many years away and the auto industry is barely using its
213. John March, The White Space Black Hole, AT&T (Apr. 2, 2015, 12:09 PM), http://
www.attpublicpolicy.com/fcc/the-white-space-black-hole/.
214. When AT&T Wireless merged with Cingular in 2005 the new entity (now called
AT&T Mobility) emerged with 50,000 cell sites. AT&T Mobility, WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AT%26T_Mobility (last visited April 27, 2015). Company officials
claim that the total continues to grow, but the authors could find no more recent citation.
215. Pico or femto cells further subdividing licensed spectrum into smaller cell sites
within macro cells. The 40,000 count is an end-of-2015 projection by AT&T. Phil Goldstein,
AT&T Exec: We’ll be Adding 1,500 to 3,000 Cell Sites per year for ‘Foreseeable Future’,
FIERCE WIRELESS (May 21, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/at-t-
exec-we-ll-be-adding-1-500-to-3-000-cell-sites-per-year-for-foreseeable-future.
216. Phil Goldstein, Analysts: AWS-3 Auction Helps AT&T Catch up to Verizon in Spec-
trum Ownership in Major Markets, FIERCE WIRELESS (Feb. 2, 2015, 11:43 AM), http://www
.fiercewireless.com/wireless/analysts-aws-3-auction-helps-at-t-catch-up-to-verizon-spectrum-
ownership-major-markets.
217. See Joann Muller, Should Talking Cars Share Coveted Airwaves With Wifi Provid-
ers?, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joannmuller/2014/02/22/
we-interrupt-this-important-safety-message-to-bring-you-a-cute-puppy-video/#713f178d3b1e.
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dedicated airwaves. Meanwhile, convention-goers in Las Vegas can’t get a
decent Wi-fi signal.”218
In fact, on some margin, cat videos on YouTube should take precedence
over this “life-saving technology.” The difficulty is in finding that margin
via administrative fiat rather than via spectrum input prices. If Comcast
could buy the rights it requests from General Motors it would become
clearer to what degree the respective companies’ arguments about costs and
benefits were believed by the parties themselves.
Similar conflicts are raging with respect to LTE-U, with a dispute over
how unlicensed bands are used to complement mobile networks.219 Wireless
ISPs object to an FCC-proposed power limit reduction in use of the 5.8 GHz
band to protect hotspots from interference. One “WISP, which serves certain
rural regions of northern California, said the combined effect of narrowing
the band and the lowering power levels could result in 700 to 1,000 of its
subscribers losing service.”220 Perhaps such harmful effects are worth the
benefits provided by the change, perhaps not. Without competitive bidding
to reveal tradeoffs, regulators will hear competing stories but be lacking hard
evidence.
The current interest in deploying LTE in unlicensed bands is due, in
part, to the availability of unlicensed spectrum at zero price. LTE is designed
to accommodate more total traffic (with acceptable delays) than comparable
Wi-Fi systems, as it is designed for situations in which the operator controls
and coordinates traffic in the local environment. The increase in “spectral
efficiency” (as opposed to economic efficiency) is achieved with network-
based interference management in which power and bandwidth are adap-
tively allocated among users by a centralized scheduler to satisfy different
requests for data rates, depending on the applications. In contrast, Wi-Fi uses
a simpler “listen- before-talk” scheme, economical in some circumstances,
but which supports less traffic when congestion becomes more significant.
Motivated by their desire to capture throughput gains from utilizing all
available spectrum resources (licensed and unlicensed), operators have initi-
ated an industry-wide standards effort to modify LTE for deployment in un-
licensed spectrum by incorporating the “listen- before-talk” feature. The
effort attempts to mitigate the mismatch between LTE, a technology de-
signed for exclusive rights, and the non-exclusive access rules assigned for
unlicensed. Adding a listen-before-talk feature is needed to prevent LTE
from disrupting Wi-Fi services, but also compromises the spectral efficiency
218. Id.
219. See Amy Schatz, FCC Plans a Vote on New Spectrum Sharing Plan, RECODE
(March 27, 2015, 2:58 PM), http://recode.net/2015/03/27/fcc-plans-a-vote-on-new-airwaves-
sharing-plan/.
220. Tammy Parker, Wi-Fi Advocates Clash With Automakers, WISPs Over FCC’s 5
GHz Plan, FIERCE WIRELESS (Aug. 17, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/
story/wi-fi-advocates-clash-automakers-wisps-over-fccs-5-ghz-plan/2014-08-17.
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of LTE. That is, in the presence of congestion, unlicensed LTE (LTE-U) will
accommodate less traffic than will licensed LTE, ceteris paribus. Flexible
spectrum use rules combined with market prices would allow operators to
determine whether this type of retrofitting constitutes an economically effi-
cient use of spectrum.
In fact, taking into account the marginal cost of the spectrum, as re-
vealed by market prices, would likely remove the justification for develop-
ing LTE-U entirely. If a market were used to allocate spectrum between
exclusive rights and open access, then there would be no direct incentive to
mix LTE with Wi-Fi. Instead the amount of spectrum for Wi-Fi open access
(more appropriate for short-range access) and LTE exclusive assignments
(more appropriate for wide-area coverage) could dynamically shift accord-
ing to demand. Given the absence of such a market, the observation that
cellular operators are currently willing to invest in LTE-U, despite the loss in
performance of LTE-U relative to licensed LTE, and have not deployed Wi-
Fi in licensed bands, strongly indicates that at the margin, licensed LTE
creates more value than unlicensed Wi-Fi and LTE-U. More broadly, this
suggests that licensed LTE will optimize wireless deployments (over ex-
isting technology choices) in new incremental spectrum suitable for cellular
deployments (say, below 3 GHz). In this sense LTE-U, along with LTE-
LAA (License-Assisted Access), in which the operator leverages its licensed
spectrum to aid with congestion control for the unlicensed spectrum, can be
viewed as a technology workaround in response to the economic ineffi-
ciency created by an excessive allocation of spectrum designated for license-
exempt access.
IV. PROPERLY VALUING RADIO SPECTRUM ALLOCATIONS
The quest for efficient spectrum allocations is not satisfied by the pro-
duction of studies by rival political coalitions estimating the value of appli-
cations or services hosted on various bands Even as this has come to be the
method of argumentation, it is neither empirically compelling nor theoreti-
cally sound. The policy debate should rightly focus on the costs of the re-
gime adopted, how well it will yield information for users and entrepreneurs
about competing input and output choices, and how flexible it will prove as
demands (with technological advance) shift in the future.
Forecasting rival valuations of wireless applications, however, is an ex-
ercise that dominates much of the policy analysis. It leads to serious defi-
ciencies in the resulting regulations. This can be seen by examining some of
the proffered calculations, displayed in Figure 3. This graphic expands the
estimates given earlier and discussed above. In general, the value of mobile
services, using licensed spectrum, dominate the magnitudes estimated for
Wi-Fi and applications relying primarily on access to unlicensed bands. Of
course, the estimation techniques raise questions of their own, and valua-
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tions have a high variance between studies. The method used to value Wi-Fi
technology, employed by a federal court in recent patent licensing litigation,
calculates benefits only a small fraction of what research papers show.
But the deeper point is illustrated by adding the valuations given for TV
Band spectrum in the United States. According to a 2014 study sponsored by
the National Association of Broadcasters, broadcast TV (and, by implica-
tion, the TV Band spectrum allocation) generates over $700 billion in eco-
nomic benefit annually This is virtually a complete over-statement, as only
about ten percent of households rely on broadcast TV for their video inputs
(the rest subscribing to cable, satellite or broadband networks), and all non-
subscribing households could be served by these alternative platforms. Even
if subsidized with free-to-home satellite service replacing terrestrial broad-
casts, the expense would be only about $500 million annually (amortizing a
$3 billion one time cost, discussed above). Hence, the value of the content –
or the apps – can be wildly over-estimated. And the incentives for interests
groups promoting certain allocations is to fund studies that do so.
But even if they produced flawless valuations of given usage patterns,
what information would be yielded? The existing employments are sugges-
tive, not determinative, of the impacts yielded by marginal allocations (ad-
ding, subtracting, reallocating) going forward. That the TV Band is being
reduced – by policy actions that go in the right direction, if not encompass
all the efficiencies that they might – is a step forward in terms of the appro-
priate trade-offs for spectrum allocation. But, as represented, the existing TV
Band shows up as the most valued frequency space now in existence. The
method of analysis, this powerfully suggests, leaves much to be desired.
Wi-Fi has proven popular. But so have mobile networks. At the margin,
which is the optimal way to expand bandwidth access? With the coming of
5G technologies, how should networks be densified – with additional Wi-Fi
routers, or “small cells”? The easy answer is “both,” but that is non-respon-
sive: how much of either? And how does the answer vary with respect to
local topography, demand, existing infrastructure and other factors? The
Economist writes that “5G will require base stations closer to users,” and
that that implies that “hundreds of microcellular access points” will be
needed to fill in the gaps between macro-cellular base stations.221 Perhaps
more spectrum, allocated to microcells, is the best way to proceed, or more
spectrum allocated to Wi-Fi would be superior. Or just building out more
access points, split evenly, will out-perform alternatives, conserving
bandwidth for other employments.
Without price information from competing bids for rival allocations the
answers are more obscure than they might otherwise be. Indeed, it is diffi-
221. Your Phone on Steroids: With 5G Mobile, Wireless will go even Faster than Fibre,
THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/
21646962-5g-mobile-wireless-will-be-faster-fibre-your-phone-steroids.
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cult for administrators to decide, as competition in the political market en-
tails delays and transaction costs. To the degree that such are economized in
an auction of generic liberal licenses, whereby usage decisions are delegated
to market competitors, the values associated with rival allocations should
reflect this. In fact, these implications are often ignored.
FIG. 3. VALUE ESTIMATES FOR LICENSED AND
UNLICENSED SPECTRUM ($B/YR.)222
(Sources: Thanki (2009), supra note 84; Milgrom et al. (2011); Thanki (2012); CEA
(Consumer Electronics Association), Unlicensed Spectrum and the U.S. Economy: Quan-
tifying the Market Size and Diversity of Unlicensed Devices, White Paper (June 2014),
available at https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7521751149.pdf; Innovatio IP Ventures (2013),
supra note 42; Hazlett (2005); Entner (2008), supra at notes for Table 6; Hazlett et al.
(2012); Bazelon & Henry (2015), supra at notes for Table 6; Hazlett (2009); Coleman
Bazelon, The Need for Additional Spectrum for Wireless Broadband: The Economic Ben-
efits and Costs of Reallocations, White Paper for the Consumer Electronics Association
(March 2009); NAB (2015), supra note 132.)
The FCC’s 2010 National Broadband Plan signaled an important ad-
vance in spectrum allocation policy.223 It focused attention on the use of the
TV Band, as allocated decades ago, for wireless services in the current econ-
omy. The agency did not deliver a perfect reform package224 but it did offer
important improvements in the analytical mode.
222. Estimates not sponsored by interested parties are denoted with an asterisk (*).
223. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra note 2.
224. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT, EFFICIENT SPECTRUM REALLOCATION WITH HOLD-UPS
AND WITHOUT NIRVANA (2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2440003.
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The Commission recognized the historical TV Band allocation as a spe-
cific regulatory choice governing spectrum inputs, in that there were many
other ways (not using traditional terrestrial broadcasting as narrowly permit-
ted with existing TV licenses) to deliver video products to viewers. Pursuing
this angle, the FCC considered input substitution (allowing digital TV chan-
nels to be shared by multiple TV stations, and station channel assignments to
be packed closer together) and output substitution (cable, satellite and broad-
band for broadcast TV). The FCC considered the idea that some increment
of television frequencies could be shifted to alternative uses, and focused
attention on the costs and benefits of these marginal changes in reconfigur-
ing band usage.
And, perhaps most importantly, the FCC sought to embrace “market-
based mechanisms” for determining how much spectrum to reallocate from
television to liberal licenses permitting mobile network services.225 The
prices yielded in the Reverse Auction bidding, where TV stations offer to
sell licenses back to the government, define a supply curve.226 The prices
yielded in the Forward Auction, where bidders reveal what they will pay for
exclusive, flexible-use access rights, define a demand curve. The govern-
ment aims to mimic a market reallocation, jumping past the rigidities put
into place by TV license assignments that began in 1939.
There is institutional progress to chart. An attempt to do so, in narrative
form, appears in Table 8. Contrasted with the TV Band Spectrum Valuation
Fallacy, outlined earlier, it might point the way to an improved template for
policy analysis.
TABLE 8. POLICY REFORM GAINS IN FCC BROADCAST
TV SPECTRUM REFORM (2010)
FCC
FCC Question Consideration FCC Action Comment
TV Band hosts Yes, but more Plan for TV Band Incremental
valuable services? valuable services spectrum margins explicitly
could be more reallocation via considered.
supported with Incentive Auction.
some frequencies.
What is Demands for Plan to reallocate Regulator explores
opportunity cost of additional capacity MHz from TV both sides of trade-
TV Band? in cellular Band to permissive off analysis.
networks evaluated licenses.
– the “mobile data
tsunami.”
225. See FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra note 2.
226. Id.
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Other inputs/ Yes. TV stations Buying TV The false identity
outputs substitute can use less licenses back, between app value
for these spectral bandwidth.  Cable, repacking TV and spectrum value
resources? satellite, broadband Band, reallocating is broken.
and mobile frequencies to
networks also liberal licenses
transmit video then sold in
content. forward auction.
Appropriate Yes - 294 MHz Reducing (by 40 Progress in using
quantity margin? found excessive. MHz to 120 MHz) “market-based
TV Band, incentives” to
depending on price reallocate bands.
bids.
Low cost future Switching TV Liberal licenses The Incentive
spectrum licenses to liberal allow spectrum Auction
reconfigurations? licenses reduces inputs to change incorporates price
reallocation delays employments. revelation,
due to regulatory informing
process (6 to 13 reallocations,
years documented). although the
transition
mechanism is
costlier than
necessary.
With the coming of 5G networks, both pricing information and spectrum
use flexibility will become even more socially useful. This technological
upgrade is focused on densifying base stations, moving fixed networks
closer to end users, re-using radio frequency spaces more intensely. Offloads
from RF links to wired transport lines will shift. But how, and by how
much? It depends on the relevant prices for infrastructure and spectrum. As
shown in the debates over LTE-U and the 5.9 GHz band, as well as in the
choice between small cells (sharing licensed spectrum) and Wi-Fi (using
unlicensed spectrum), fundamental options can be technologically defined,
but optimal choices require valuation data:
There are various combinations of resources – transmission power,
antenna height and directivity, frequency of transmission, method of
propagation, etc. – that can be utilized to achieve a given level of
(received) power at a point distant from the point of transmission.
The range of alternative combinations is determined by technology
– the state of the arts – and is an engineering problem. The “proper”
combination actually to use to achieve a given goal is, however, an
economic problem and is not (properly) soluble solely in terms of
engineering data.227
227. COASE ET AL., supra note 20, at 23.
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V. CONCLUSION
FCC to Decide in Battle for TV Spectrum
—WALL STREET JOURNAL headline (Aug. 18, 2008)
Considerable evidence has accumulated on the challenges of radio spec-
trum allocation policy. The traditional regulatory approach, still commonly
employed, has proven needlessly expensive. Without valuation information
that might otherwise be gleaned from competitive bidding, it forces adminis-
trative choices to be made across the various regimes, licensed and unli-
censed. In this process, as captioned by the Wall Street Journal, policy
makers impose fundamental choices.
There are alternative pathways, and regulators have seen their advan-
tages. It is standard for policy makers to pronounce technological and ser-
vice neutrality as best practices. Instead of planning specific technologies,
business models or applications, and then requisitioning spectrum inputs, it
has become evident that allowing flexible use of radio spectrum can generate
large social gains.
In both licensed and unlicensed spectrum, considerable progress has
been made towards liberalization over the past three decades. But the under-
lying spectrum allocation still holds vast amounts of spectrum hostage to
traditional rules and restrictions. This forecloses the rich flows of informa-
tion revealing market demands. And, as practiced, often results in a confla-
tion of the value of given wireless applications with the optimal deployment
of radio spectrum inputs. That can result in distinct and enormously costly
misallocations, as in the Broadcast TV Spectrum Valuation Fallacy.
Spectrum reallocation is seriously impeded by the “shipping and han-
dling” costs of the administrative process. It is appropriate to examine alter-
natives that better reveal marginal valuations and which distribute incentives
for diverse agents to contribute to positive sum transactions. The FCC de-
scribed its proposal for an Incentive Auction, as a “market-based way to
reassign spectrum, shifting a contentious process to a cooperative one.”228
Whatever the outcome of that particular exercise, the quest to discover new
and improved means for moving spectrum into the most productive employ-
ments is an important step in the right direction.
Most fundamentally, that is not because the apps provided in licensed
spectrum are more valuable than the apps provided in unlicensed. It is be-
cause market-based mechanisms that reveal superior information about rela-
tive values, and that allow for adjustments to be made by well-incentivized
actors not constrained by administrative spectrum allocation rules, can ac-
commodate efficient activities with special force. Were the parties to be ar-
guing for more unlicensed allocations, or for different types of unlicensed
rules, to bid against parties with different arguments, demands for the con-
228. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, supra note 2, at 81.
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flicting approaches could be made visible. New bandwidth could be made
available, without the debilitating burdens of deadening regulatory delay or
tragedy of the anti-commons, to support the most valuable. Public parks, like
unlicensed bands, are best provided transparently, with preferences explic-
itly revealed. It is not anti-Wi-Fi to suggest that liberal licenses offer pro-
nounced transaction cost advantages any more than to suggest that the
transition from broadcast to cable or the reallocation of TV Band airwaves in
the FCC’s Incentive Auction are anti-television. Video distribution is facili-
tated, made more efficient and robust, by allowing spectrum to migrate from
the TV Band to mobile networks. Similarly, the use model associated with
Wi-Fi – plug ‘n play low-power devices wherein spectrum access rights are
embedded – may be broadly accommodated, and productively expanded,
with the use of price signals that guide decisions about how to deploy radio
spectrum.
Categorical pronouncements that the world is embracing Wi-Fi and that,
therefore, licensed allocations should be pre-empted by unlicensed bands fit
neither economic theory nor empirical assessments of consumer welfare.
MLE (2011) argue that unlicensed frequencies were “garbage bands” that
became socially valuable due to the non-exclusive rules applied to them by
the FCC, but ignore that they became “garbage bands” not due to nature but
from particular public policy choices.229 Assigning fragmented, overlapping
property rights that are difficult to rationalize often yield common interest
tragedies,230 blocking efficient responses to shifting technological options,
business innovations, and consumer demands. The view omits the fact that
“garbage bands” have been created with unlicensed allocations that have
blocked alternative employments while producing little in return – U-PCS
and, thus far, the TV “white  spaces.”
Conversely, “garbage bands” have been rehabilitated via exclusive own-
ership rights. An example is found in the creation of Nextel (now part of
Sprint) which followed from the rehabilitation of thousands of virtually use-
less Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) licenses pieced together by the entre-
preneur (and former FCC lawyer) Morgan O’Brien.231 And, as seen in the
LightSquared debacle, the presence of exclusive rights can facilitate the co-
ordination necessary to create new networks, while the absence of exclusive
rights can make that cooperation impossible.
To gauge both the value of marginal allocations, on the one hand, and
the cost of opportunities, on the other, it is necessary to take a more eco-
nomic, and broader, view of the spectrum allocation process. Rather than
associating particular applications with particular government allocations, a
229. MILGROM ET AL., supra note 9, at 16-28.
230. HELLER, supra note 13, at 37.
231. Thomas W. Hazlett & Evan Leo, The Case for Liberal Licenses: A Technical and
Economic Perspective, 26 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW 1037 (2011), at 1066-68.
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systemic approach should attempt to bring better information, greater fluid-
ity, and more effective feedback mechanisms into the market. That can be
done, but not if basic analytical and empirical tools are left unutilized.
